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On December 27th 1949, the Netherlands transferred most of the sovereignty to 
Indonesia after a decolonization-conflict that lasted for more than four years. This 
meant the end of the Dutch East Indies. The soldiers of the Royal Dutch Army 
returned home after having lived under extreme conditions in a country that was 
completely unlike anything they were used to. Over the decades that followed a 
large number of publications appeared, many of them informal. In these 
publications the former Dutch soldiers told stories about their migration to the 
Dutch East Indies as soldiers, and their return to the Netherlands after their stay 
of three to four years. For my internship at the KITLV I took stock of some of the 
published stories as well as of the interviews with former soldiers collected by the 
KITLV. What struck me was that these stories formed a more or less coherent 
collective narrative. This narrative shows primarily similarities in descriptions of 
preparations and expectations of the Dutch East Indies, their experiences in the 
Dutch East Indies, and returning home after the war. In this thesis I researched 
several possible explanations why the content of these stories that recall these 
individual expectations, perceptions and experiences is of such a collective nature.  
 
My main question therefore is how it can be that these stories, from 
different - groups of - soldiers, are so similar. Which factors influenced the soldiers 
to document their experiences in a specific period of time, and what caused the 
similarities of the content of these stories? To answer this question I looked into 
the way in which these stories came about and I placed them in the social context 
of the Netherlands after the end of the Second World War. As these stories seem 
to fall within a restricted number of templates, I subdivided the storytellers in four 
different templates to rule out any significant divergences in the soldier’s stories 
based on different backgrounds and views. These four templates entail first batch 
soldiers, second batch soldiers, soldiers who experienced extreme violence, and 
soldiers who were compassionate to the cause of the republicans. These templates 
will be further explained in chapter 6, in which I present my findings from the 
analyzed documents.  
To answer my research question I used 34 egodocuments that were 
written decades after the war: between the 1980s and 2015. I used 13 veteran 
websites, and 10 interviews that were conducted in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
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reason for using only sources from this period is that there is little information 
from earlier years. The bias this creates is addressed in the chapter on material 
and method. The egodocuments provide insights into the expectations of the 
soldiers before leaving for war, their actual experiences during their stay in the 
tropics and their journey home, and their reminiscences decades after their 
return.  
 
I argue that the main reason for the collective nature of these stories can 
be derived from the fact that they hardly had any knowledge of the Dutch East 
Indies beforehand - most of them had never even left their own province in the 
Netherlands - and that their expectations did not match the actual events and 
experiences. The end of the conflict in the Dutch East Indies was dissatisfying to 
many Dutch soldiers, and returning home, after having been in a war in a country 
that was so different from what they were used to, was difficult. Many felt their 
efforts and sacrifices had been in vain. Most of them had only had a short military 
training before being sent to the tropics to fight. They were sent out whilst under 
the impression that they were there to restore order and peace, but the reality was 
a hopeless and violent guerrilla war. When they returned home afterwards, in 
their view, little attention was paid to them and their experiences. The soldiers 
rarely referred to government support in a positive way.1 The fact that the soldiers 
had experienced a violent war and that there was little understanding back home 
for what they had been through is what bothered them most, as is apparent from 
the analyzed sources. Their similar narratives therefore derived from bottled-up 
emotions they had been carrying with them since their return to the Netherlands 
in a period of time in which individualism was still subservient to the importance 
of the collective. It was only after the cultural revolution of the sixties and 
seventies that personal issues started to become more negotiable, and human 
beings became less interwoven in social textures. The individual became of more 
importance than society as a whole.2  
                                                        
1 S. Scagliola, Last van de Oorlog: De Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden in Indonesië en hun verwerking  
(Amsterdam 2002) 276 
 
2 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The short twentieth century 1914-1991 (Great Britain 1995) 335 
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Correspondingly with this time frame reference reasons for how this 
collective narrative surfaced can be narrowed down to a number of fundamental 
triggers that occurred within this period of time in which society changed. I 
distinguish five factors that correlate with this main outline of my claim and 
further underline my argumentation on how the soldiers were triggered to 
document their stories. These factors also show why they all became stimulated 
in explaining similar experiences and issues, and expressing related emotions.  
  
1. The storytellers and authors respond to the negative image that was 
present in the Netherlands after the war ended, which, in the view of a vast 
majority, was fought under false pretenses and had failed miserably.   
2. The storytellers and authors rebel against a collective image that consists 
of reports and accusations of excessive violence.  
3. The storytellers and authors have a shared past and are part of a 
generation. They share their age, their experiences in the Netherlands, and 
their experiences in the Dutch East Indies.  
4. The Vietnam-effect: When people started to discuss Vietnam and the 
experiences of the soldiers that fought over there, the Dutch also started to 
become more aware of the subject of posttraumatic stress disorder, which 
led to a more pressing need for the Dutch former soldiers to discuss their 
experiences in the Dutch East Indies.  
5. The reunion-effect: the Dutch former soldiers met each other on a regular 
basis on veteran meetings and memorial days on which they discussed 
their experiences, read each others stories, and helped each other 
remember.  
Summarized, in this thesis I will present a content analysis of a representative 
sample of ego documents and interviews, which show conformity of the soldier’s 
stories. Secondly, I will explain why these stories are conform using the above 
mentioned five factors.   
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In chapter 2 on Theory, I will elaborate on these five factors and further explain 
how these factors triggered the soldiers into documenting their stories, and why 
there are such distinct similarities in these stories. 
 
After my chapter on Theory I will discuss previous conducted research by other 
scholars on the Dutch soldiers in chapter 3 on Historiography. I will point out how 
my own research adds to, and differs from previous methods.  
 
After the chapter on historiography I will explain the material and method I used 
to conduct the content analysis of the soldier’s stories in chapter 4.  
 
After this chapter, I present the findings of the analyzed sources in chapter 5 in 
which I tried to subdivide the different storytellers within the four templates I 
mentioned in my introduction, as long as the information in the sources was 
sufficient to do so.  
 
In chapter 6, I will present the interpretations of the findings in chapter 5, the main 
conclusions I drew from my analysis, and some additional thoughts that I felt were 
important to mention.  
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2. Theory 
In my research, I predominantly disengaged from the general approach in most of 
the previous analyses of the Dutch soldiers, that focused more on them as military 
men, rather than people, and more specifically people who migrated. Instead, I 
chose an analysis that focuses primarily on the soldier’s experiences from their 
own perspective as social beings, by using their individual stories as a starting 
point. It is an illusion to assume that soldiers stand outside of societies in practical, 
social or moral terms, and cannot be approached as civilians in our attempts to 
understand their experiences and reflections. As Joshua Sanborn expresses in his 
article Unsettling the Empire: Violent Migrations and Social Disaster in Russia 
during World War I:  
‘Instead, they are affected as social beings by the spatial dislocations of war and by 
the violence they commit, suffer, and witness. Thus it follows that military men 
should be lumped together with civilians, refugees, and camp followers. If they move, 
their social patterns are disturbed and re- arranged. If they kill, they commit 
murder.’ 3  
He argues that treating a battle zone as a social and temporal space of “violent 
migrations” allows us to understand the social interactions and change that a war 
brings about and enables us to analyze soldiers and civilians on the same level. 
Some people perpetrated violence; others suffered it, or did both. However, they 
all had the same aspect in common, namely the fact that they all lived within a 
radically new social and political ecosystem that influenced their behavior 
majorly.4  I chose a similar approach, by primarily focusing on the people behind 
the soldiers, and their personal stories. 
The egodocuments I researched were recorded between 1981 and 2015. 
In essence, the narratives in these documents are of a collective nature. As 
mentioned in my introduction, these recurring similar patterns can mostly be 
                                                        
3 Joshua Sanborn, ‘Unsettling the Empire: Violent Migrations and Social Disaster in Russia during 
World War I’. The Journal of Modern History 77 (2005) 291 
4 Ibidem, 292 
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found in descriptions of preparations and expectations of the Dutch East Indies, 
experiences in the Dutch East Indies, and returning home afterwards. 
Linking these similarities to the time frame in which the ego documents were 
written, combined with the secondary literature and social climate in the 
Netherlands during and after the war of independence, I detected five factors that 
may explain why, decades after the war, a collective narrative was formed. I will 
now further discuss these factors.  
 
1. The storytellers and authors respond to the negative image that was 
present in the Netherlands after the war ended, which, in the view of 
a vast majority, was fought under false pretenses and had failed 
miserably.   
The enthusiasm with which the British and Canadian troops were welcomed in 
the West of the Netherlands on Tuesday 8th of May 1945 was an expression of utter 
joy over the fact that the Dutch were finally liberated, despite of and thanks to all 
the sacrifices that these soldiers had to make. All of those cheering Dutch people 
knew what kind of efforts were made by these soldiers in order to reach this goal, 
and this knowledge brought forth a profound gratitude. 5  The Dutch soldiers 
belonged to the same cohort, which lived during the Second World War and 
experienced the Liberation and the reception of the Allied Troops. Most of the 
Dutch soldiers expected to some extent to get the same enthusiasm as the British 
and Canadian troops received when they were welcomed in the Netherlands in 
1945. This however, did not turn out to be the case, neither upon arrival in 
Indonesia, nor upon return in the Netherlands. After the soldiers returned, the 
Second World War was still a frame of reference regarding attitudes towards war.6 
The veterans kept being confronted with this ‘exemplary war’, where good and 
bad were clearly defined. Not just in history books, but also at commemorations, 
welfare institutions and psychiatric hospitals. The soldiers were unfavorably 
compared, even though they left for the Dutch East Indies with good intentions.7   
                                                        
5 L. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog deel 10B (Den Haag 1988) 
1436 
6 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 363 
7 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 444 
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The Netherlands was determined to restore its power and was only slightly 
willing to make some concessions in the relationship between the Netherlands 
and the Indonesian archipelago. This had a lot to do with the general fear of losing 
substantial income, which was generally expressed by the slogan: ‘Indië verloren, 
rampspoed geboren’, which freely translates into: losing the Indies will bring us 
misfortune. Even though the United States and Great Britain urged the 
Netherlands to drop the Dutch East Indies as a colony, the dominant sentiment in 
the Netherlands was that the pre-war relationship between the Netherlands and 
the Dutch-Indies could be restored.8  
As the war kept being prolonged and the perspective became more inauspicious, 
the desire to return back to the Netherlands grew. This was the case most of all 
for soldiers who had been stationed in the Dutch East Indies for a lengthy period, 
but also their family and friends were hoping for a speedy return. Partly because 
of this reason, the Dutch Government decided to expedite the demobilization. 
The military leadership, however, objected to this. They felt rushing was 
irresponsible. This led in September 1948 to another prorogation of the 
demobilization, which caused disappointment and anger amongst the soldiers. It 
was not until May 1949 that the demobilization was resumed. It would then take 
until 1951 before the last soldiers were actually back in the Netherlands.  
The soldiers had mixed feelings concerning their return. They were hoping 
for appreciation, but feared lack of understanding. Next to the longing to go back 
home again and go on with their lives, the Dutch soldiers were also cynical and 
had a lot of worries. These worries were magnified by the chain of command of 
the Dutch army, which stressed that the Netherlands was nowhere near 
recuperated from the war and the transition from their life in the Dutch East 
Indies to the bourgeois existence in the Netherlands was not going to be easy. 
The main sentiment amongst the soldiers was therefore that it was merely a lost 
period of time, and a meaningless operation.9 Many soldiers did not know how to 
deal with the disappointment of losing the war and the idle sacrifices they made, 
                                                        
8 Piet de Rooy, ‘Een zoekende tijd. De ongemakkelijke democratie, 1913-1949’, in: Remieg Aerts, 
c.s. (eds.), Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990 
(Nijmegen/Amsterdam 1999) 179-160, 259  
9 Gert Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië 1945-1950. Getuigenissen van een oorlog aan de verkeerde 
kant van de geschiedenis (Amsterdam 2015) 280-281 
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combined with the unpopularity of the war in the Netherlands. A sense of 
accomplishment could not be constructed or steered by Dutch government 
actions. These actions entailed payment settlements or schooling possibilities 
that were offered and were therefore merely materialistic. These actions were 
mostly met with cynicism, and it did not offer sufficient compensation for 
feelings of alienation.10    
 
2. The storytellers and authors rebel against a collective image that 
consists of reports and accusations of excessive violence.  
 
In January 1946, the first word of Dutch soldiers burning down kampongs reached 
the Netherlands, after which more reports were being published in the press on 
violent situations in the Dutch East Indies. The daily newspaper De Waarheid 
(newspaper of the Communist Party of the Netherlands - CPN) and weekly papers 
Vrij Nederland (Dutch Leftist newspaper) and the Groene Amsterdammer (Dutch 
independent newsmagazine) cited from this moment, on a regular basis, letters of 
critical soldiers on acts of violence in Indonesia. These reports were often followed 
by questions in Parliament, but it was not until February 1949 that tempers ran 
high enough to cause the government to request an independent investigation. In 
October 1949 a commission of lawyers was founded that was assigned with a non-
judicial investigation on the nature and size of these apparent excesses, and on 
possible measures by the Dutch authorities that had already been taken until that 
point. These lawyers left for Indonesia around October 1949, but were 
commissioned back due to the transfer of sovereignty. A report was written after 
this, although this was mainly aimed at the South-Sulawesi case11. The fact that 
this report was limited was possibly due to the premature departure of the 
commission. Other investigations to disclose what happened in the Dutch East 
Indies were all rejected by the government. It was not until 1960, that the 
government finally decided to conduct a secret data-research in which dr. M. Boon 
was to gather all data on the subject, and to hold interviews. However, any 
                                                        
10 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 443 
11 The South-Celebes case was a course and bloody action, led by Dutch captain Raymond 
Westerling in the South of Sulawesi, Indonesia, at the end of 1946 / beginning of 1947.  
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outcome was not to be expected soon, due to the extensive amount of source 
data.12 
 On December 19th 1968, the newspaper De Volkskrant published an 
interview with psychologist Joop Hueting, and in January of the following year he 
was interviewed for the news program ‘Achter het Nieuws’ (transl. ‘Behind the 
News). This particular interview caused a lot of commotion and the trauma of the 
war resurfaced. Hueting talked about the way soldiers, including himself, behaved 
while they were in Indonesia during the so-called ‘police actions’. These comments 
by Hueting caused a wave of emotional and indignant reactions. The national 
paper De Telegraaf was critical and matter-of-factly stated that atrocities are 
simply a part of war, and that it was unfair to revive these ‘incidental atrocities’ to 
those Dutch soldiers who gave the best years of their lives for a war that turned 
out – in hindsight – to be fruitless. Besides the somewhat indignant response by 
the media on Hueting’s statements, many veterans were also jumpy about the 
whole subject, and felt personally attacked. However, some of them recognized 
their own experiences in Huetings confessions, and were relieved they too might 
be able to clear their conscience.13   
Commissioned by the government, the ‘Excessennota’ was published in that 
same year, which consisted of the results of archival research on possible war 
crimes that were committed by Dutch soldiers in Indonesia between 1946 and 
1950. This research was directly induced by the interview with Joop Hueting. 
The Excessennota contained a list of events constituting excesses that were 
presented in an individualistic isolated context, and was far from a complete 
account. There was no possible explanation presented in the Excessennota that 
could interpret the excesses as something that happened structurally. It was in 
fact even mentioned in the nota that the collected data confirmed that there had 
not been any sign of systematic cruelty, and that analyzing more sources would 
not lead to a different conclusion. 
                                                        
12  ‘De Excessennota’ in: Andere Tijden, VPRO April 9th, 2002 
(http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2001-2002/De-
excessennota.html) Last consulted on 2nd of February, 2017 
13 ‘De Excessennota’ in: Andere Tijden, VPRO April 9th, 2002 
(http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2001-2002/De-
excessennota.html) Last consulted on 2nd of February 2017 
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On the day the Excessennota was presented, the news in the Netherlands 
was overshadowed by a substantial revolt that was happening in Willemstad, 
Curacao. The Excessennota was pushed back into a dark corner, and there was also 
little interest for the planned debate in the Second Chamber on the subject a 
month later. Joop den Uyl, political leader of the Partij van de Arbeid (Labour 
party) tried to hold a parliamentary survey on the nota, but failed.14  
 In 1988, Lou de Jong finally finished his account of the history of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in World War II (Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog). His last volume was an epilogue, in which he addressed the 
period 1945-1950 in Indonesia. In this epilogue De Jong initially made a strong 
judgment against committed war crimes. A concept version of this epilogue had 
been leaked to the public, which again led to a sense of indignation amongst many 
veterans, and again emotions ran high. This made De Jong change these 
statements and concluded, diplomatically, that it is hard to judge whether or not 
something qualifies as a war crime, but that primary responsibility should always 
lie with the highest political leaders. These annoyances with De Jong’s claims were 
part of the first incentives among veterans to organize themselves.15  
 
3. The storytellers and authors have shared an affecting past and are 
part of a generation. They share their age, their experiences in the 
Netherlands, and their experiences in the Dutch East Indies. 
 
Major events in world history have the propensity to generate a specific sense of 
generation, whether it is self-implicated or imposed by others. These Dutch 
former soldiers also form a generation. J.A.A. van Doorn in “Gevangen in De Tijd” 
has already analyzed this specific generation. A “generation” according to Van 
Doorn is a group of people that share similar experiences within the same period 
of time. The people within this group are relatively young, although this is not the 
main characteristic of a generation. The fact that people of a stigmatized 
generation (whether implicated upon themselves or by others) are young can be 
                                                        
14 Ibidem 
15 J.W.M. Schulten, ‘Het afgeschreven leger. De Indië-veteranen en hun strijd om erkenning’, in: 
Teitler and Hoffenaar, (eds.) De Politionele Acties (1990) 98 
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explained by the classical generation-theory according to Becker and Righart16, 
which states that the adolescent years are their most vulnerable and formative 
years in which they are most likely to respond actively to new experiences. These 
new experiences create a gap between this (self) stigmatized group and its 
environment, i.e., the older generation as well as their peers who did not share the 
same experiences and therefore form a different generation. 17 
J.A.A. van Doorn gives the following definition of a generation (paraphrased):  
A generation consists of people within more or less the same age group, who 
have shared similar experiences, and are part of a communal history. Due to the fact 
that they share a similar past, they will develop specific generation awareness. This 
awareness will become more poignant as the communal experiences form an 
increasingly stronger imprint on the generation. This does not end with time-bound 
stories and images. In fact, there are even specific behavioral patterns occurring, as 
well as possible social formations that are prone to exist for a relative long period of 
time, and are relative insensitive to contemporary social and cultural changes within 
their common homeland.18  
According to Van Doorn, a war can be a significant reason for a generation 
to be formed. However, a war-generation does not necessarily form a unity, and 
we have to distinguish between soldiers and civilians.19 In the case of this research 
the distinction is drawn between Dutch soldiers leaving to fight the war in 
Indonesia and the civilians staying in The Netherlands. In other words: the 
generation of the Dutch soldiers fighting in a war in a faraway country and the 
generation of post-World War II Dutch civilians rebuilding their lives back home. 
Soldiers will generally have faced more danger than civilians, and experienced 
                                                        
16 J.A.A. Van Doorn, Gevangen in de Tijd: Over generaties en hun geschiedenis (Amsterdam 2002) 
191  
17 Ibidem, 191-192 
18 Van Doorn, Gevangen in de tijd, 25  “ Een generatie bestaat uit personen van ongeveer dezelfde 
leeftijd die gegeven hun historische gesitueerdheid een eigen verhaal hebben te vertellen. Daar 
zij hetzelfde verleden delen, zullen zij aan de hand daarvan een specifiek generatiebesef 
ontwikkelen. Dit besef zal in het algemeen pregnanter zijn naarmate de gemeenschappelijke 
ervaringen een sterkere stempel op de generatie hebben gedrukt. Het blijf dan niet bij 
tijdsgebonden verhalen en beelden, maar er ontstaan specifieke gedragspatronen en mogelijk 
sociale formaties die zich langere tijd weten te handhaven, relatief ongevoelig voor de inmiddels 
optredende maatschappelijke en culturele veranderingen.”  
19 Ibidem, 25 
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war from a wholly different perspective. Consequently, soldiers are more likely to 
have a specific generation-awareness that differs from that of civilians. Not only 
did The Dutch soldiers generally feel misunderstood by the government, they also 
felt disadvantaged vis-à-vis their peers, who were miles ahead in building a career 
and starting a family. These feelings were magnified by the fact that many soldiers 
felt the Dutch government did not pay enough attention to the demobilization of 
the soldiers.20  
 
4. The Vietnam-effect: When people started to discuss Vietnam and the 
experiences of the soldiers that fought over there, the Dutch also 
started to become more aware of the subject of posttraumatic stress 
disorder, which led to a more pressing need for the Dutch former 
soldiers to discuss their experiences in the Dutch East Indies.  
By the end of the Vietnam War, a minority of the Americans that fought there came 
back suffering from many horrible injuries and psychological problems. Arthur 
Egendorf describes this in his, partially, autobiographic book Healing from the 
war: trauma and transformation after Vietnam:  
‘Many vets changed during the war. People ask, “What did [caused] it?” and expect 
to hear a story that explains how it happened. But the expectation is misplaced. 
The change is never explained by the sequence of events. All you get from the story 
is that a man goes into a situation looking at the world one way, and, then, after 
this whole view comes apart for reasons he can never fully explain, he emerges 
seeing things another way. You hear about killing and being shot at and observing 
horrors. But since war is filled with such events, the question inevitably is how 
this particular incident gave rise to [such a] profound change. From a healing 
perspective, the ultimate answer is that regardless of what helped set the stage, it 
is always the person at the center of the experience who shapes and colors what 
takes place. And the times and places we call turning points in our lives can no 
more be explained or justified than the elements an artist chooses for a work of 
art.’21  
                                                        
20 Van Doorn, Gevangen in de tijd, 38 
21 A. Egendorf, Healing from the War: trauma and transformation after Vietnam (Boston 1985) 65 
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Most veterans did not realize the change they went through until after they 
returned from the war. This quote also illustrates a very common notion for the 
Vietnam veterans when they returned to America, which, similar to the Dutch 
veterans, was the incomprehension of the people at home, the people that stayed. 
As Arthur Egendorf, a veteran himself, stated in his book:  
‘For guys from small towns in middle America, coming back might not have been 
so jolting, but ask most vets what it was like and they’ll tell you about a run-in 
with somebody who didn’t have the faintest idea what was going on over there. 
Maybe it was some pro-war hardhat or an anti-war student. In either version, the 
vet lost out.”22 
The way the attention towards the Dutch soldiers and their experiences 
evolved ever since they returned will tell us more about the way this matter 
became more pressing for the soldiers to talk about. If at first the subject of Dutch 
military action in Indonesia was kept aloof, then it is not unlikely that many 
soldiers did the same and merely tried to continue with their lives. 
However, after the interview with Hueting the Dutch were confronted with their 
own colonial past. The fact that the ‘old’ news on Dutch terror suddenly made an 
impact was connected to the political climate of the late 1960s. In all of Western 
Europe, students were protesting, and critique on the war in Vietnam was 
increasing. Also in The Netherlands, a younger generation was acting against the 
established order that supported US foreign policy. This was exactly the setting 
that Hueting’s exposure needed, to cause more than just a small media stir, 
because the realization became clearer that The Netherlands had also known a 
‘Vietnam’ situation.23 
People in the Netherlands became more critical of possible war crimes 
committed by the soldiers after that, and the fact that the Vietnam War showed 
that there is such a thing as war trauma, the urge to speak up and to express 
discontent started to become more acute. In the 1980s, publications appeared 
that were triggered by the Vietnam War on traumatic effects of war-experiences. 
The importance of aftercare for soldiers became more evident.24 The 
                                                        
22 ibidem, 25 
23 Scagliola, Last van de Oorlog, 108 
24 Van Doorn, Gevangen in de tijd, 59 
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psychological burden of their military past accrued and Dutch East Indies 
veterans became diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The realization 
that their issues were real and should have been paid more attention to may 
have triggered the urge to finally speak out about their experiences in the field. 
 
5. The reunion-effect: the Dutch former soldiers meet each other on a 
regular basis on veteran meetings and memorial days on which they 
discuss their experiences, read each other’s stories, and help each 
other remember.  
 
Most of the egodocuments were written and published after the soldiers 
returned. The target audience differed, but memoirs were often published as a 
collection of stories from soldiers who belonged to the same battalion. These 
collected stories were a way to remember together with comrades, to sustain 
mutual comradery.  By talking to each other and remembering together, the 
soldiers adopted each other’s views, which led to a collective, homogenous 
narrative. The need for a remembrance for the killed soldiers, and all the Dutch 
soldiers that shared the same experiences in the Dutch East Indies was an 
important incentive to start documenting these narratives. It is often mentioned 
that the book’s intention is to preserve the memories and to describe to others 
involved – like other soldiers or politicians – what actually took place in the 
Dutch East Indies.  
This motivation became more prominent as the decades passed, and the 
intended audience became broader: family, friends and acquaintances, and in a 
later stage children and grandchildren.25 The largest collection of ego documents 
was written after 1990. The Dutch soldiers became pensionable and had the time 
to reflect and write down their experiences. This also led to a need to organize 
meetings with other veterans and to unveil the National Indië Monument in 
Roermond in 1988 were many would return yearly for a commemoration 
ceremony. This, most likely, triggered them even more to document their 
memoirs.26 ‘Now, that I’ve past the age of 70, I will not keep my mouth shut 
                                                        
25 Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië, 41-42 
26 Ibidem, 164 
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anymore. […] The younger generation needs to know what happened, and needs 
to know what a guerrilla war entails: a sudden and silent assassination attempt 
on your life, in a sea of mortal fear.’ This quote is from a soldier going by the 
name of ‘Bob D.’ who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Historiography 
                                                        
27 Anton P de Graaff, Levenslang op patrouille (Franeker, 2000), 34: ‘Nu ik de 70 ben gepasseerd 
houd ik mijn mond niet meer. […] De jongere generatie moet weten wat er gebeurd is en moet 
weten wat een guerrilla-oorlog betekent: een plotselinge en stille moordaanslag op je leven, in 
een zee van doodsangst.’ 
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Every veteran who has a part in this collective narrative values the legitimacy of 
his own personal account, which makes reaching a consensus on the meaning of 
this conflict, and its aftermath with regard to the soldiers, difficult. Which is why 
the best way to do so is by collecting the similarities in these individual stories. 
Important factors are at stake for the soldiers, such as national pride, military 
honour, and financial compensation, but also negative feelings such as fear, 
disappointment, resentment and guilt. That is why it is important to include these 
personal accounts in researching this conflict. The experiences of individual 
veterans should be regarded as fragments of the bigger story. Historical facts and 
journalistic reports provide little support to the individual process of signification. 
The veteran feels a need to express his feelings and point of view about that 
period, especially if his experiences left an emotional imprint. The need for 
justification is notable in the egodocuments.  
The psychological process of signification collides with the national-
political expostulation. The dissonance in the interpretation of this conflict is also 
connected to this specific type of warfare. It was not a regular war with clear 
frontlines, but a guerilla war in which extreme violence was used. Standards for 
right and wrong were blurred. Moreover, this was a war of decolonization, which 
exacerbated feelings of loss and disappointment in the Netherlands. 28  The 
perspective of the individual, therefore, is of great importance in understanding 
the conflict and the experiences of these young men. Because certain significant 
elements are recurrent in the narratives of the soldiers, they have to be addressed 
and this analysis is therefore an important complement to the contemporary 
research of this conflict.  
The literature discussed at length below on the Dutch East Indies veterans 
mostly refers to government support and psychological care upon return. Until a 
few recent publications, on which I will elaborate below, the primary focus has 
been on the general process of demobilization and factual historical events during 
and after the war. Sentiments among the Dutch soldiers have been mostly 
addressed as a side issue, rather than the primary subject in which the perspective 
of the soldiers is the starting point, attributing them as social beings instead of 
                                                        
28 Scagliola, Last van de Oorlog, 18 
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military men. I will now further discuss these previous accounts of the subject of 
the Dutch soldiers.  
The Dutch government took a number of measures to help the returnees to 
get a job quickly. Government support was predominantly materialistic; 
psychological care was not offered. So the first step upon return was to get a job 
or to study. This was brought into effect by providing settlements in kind or in 
payments. A returning Dutch soldier had a right to a hundred guilders and a bonus 
of ten guilders for each month he spent in the Dutch East Indies. Next to this he 
received seventy guilders or a ‘civilian suit’, textile coupons and a free public 
transport card, which was valid for a month. The soldiers were also given a salary 
over the entire period of leave. If the old employer was not able or willing to 
reinstate the soldier as an employee, mediation through an employment office 
would be offered. Possibilities for schooling, getting a scholarship or an interest-
free cash advance were also supplied. Independent entrepreneurs, whose 
business was damaged due to being away for so long, could apply for a business 
allowance. If someone would still be out of a job, despite all of the possibilities the 
government offered, they could apply for an (periodical) allowance. These 
measures reflect what was considered to be most important in Dutch society at 
the end of the 1940s, which, for the soldiers, was to regain their position in the 
labor system, rather than restoring their mental balance.29     
Jan Hoffenaar, for instance, addressed the issue of repatriation in his article ‘De 
terugkeer van de militairen van de Koninklijke Landmacht uit Indonesië’, in 
1990.30 He deliberately focused on the process of repatriation, rather than the 
perception of the repatriates themselves. He analyzed the actions the government 
took to meet the needs of the soldiers, rather than elaborating on the experiences 
of the soldiers. He stays on the surface when he addresses the critical responses 
of the soldiers towards the government and explains it as a fairly logical result of 
serving in a war combined with the fact that psychological aid was insufficient. 
According to Hoffenaar, repatriation was postponed, and the longer the soldiers 
                                                        
29 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 274-275 
30 J. Hoffenaar, ‘De terugkeer van de militairen van de Koninklijke Landmacht uit Indonesië (1947-
1951)’, in: B. Schoenmaker c.s. (eds.), Mededelingen van de sectie militaire geschiedenis 
landmachtstaf, deel 13 (Den Haag 1990) 99-134 
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had to stay in the Indies, the more critical and skeptical they became towards the 
way they were compensated back in the Netherlands.  J.A.A. van Doorn, who 
himself was one of those Dutch soldiers, wrote in his book Gevangen in de tijd: ‘[…] 
Now that ‘our boys’ had returned, the book could be closed. The government did 
not see this any differently. The demobilization was settled quite efficiently. In 
material regard, the veterans got a decent, if modest, treatment, but nothing more 
than that. Like so many other groups that returned to the Netherlands after the 
war, they were approached as merely an administrative category that after 
registration, a few hundred guilders in cash and some rationing coupons, were 
expected to go back to work as soon as possible. Different from surrounding 
countries, these demobilized soldiers did not find comfort in any veteran 
movements. There were a few organizations like those of military war victims and 
(former) shock troops, but for everything else, the Indië veterans missed out on 
any forerunners or examples.31 
According to Stef Scagliola it is a myth that the Dutch government did 
nothing for the returning soldiers from the Dutch East Indies, if only because it 
would bring about social unrest and agitation in a large group of dissatisfied young 
men. Expectations were that young, unsatisfied people might be eligible for 
extremist ideologies and with the recent concerns with communism in mind it was 
regarded a priority to take care of the returning troops.32 Similar to what Scagliola 
mentioned about the repatriation, Hoffenaar also noted that official bodies shared 
the opinion that demobilization was quite successful. This contrasts with the 
opinion of the majority of the returning veterans as they expressed it many years 
later.33 
                                                        
31 Van Doorn, Gevangen in de Tijd ,38-39: “[…] Nu ‘onze jongens’ terug waren, kon het boek 
worden gesloten. De overheid zag het niet anders. De demobilisatie werd redelijk efficiënt 
afgewikkeld. In materieel opzicht kregen de oud-strijders een fatsoenlijke zij het sobere 
behandeling, maar daarmee was het dan ook bekeken. Zoals zoveel andere groepen die na de 
oorlog naar Nederland terugkeerden, werden ze benaderd als een administratieve categorie die 
na registratie, een paar honderd gulden in contanten en wat distributiebonnen, geacht werd 
gewoon weer aan het werk te gaan. Anders dan in de omringende landen troffen de 
gedemobiliseerde militairen geen veteranenbeweging aan waarin zij hun plaats hadden kunnen 
vinden. Er bestonden enkele bonden, zoals die van militaire oorlogsslachtoffers en van (oud-
)Stoottroepers, maar voor het overige misten de Indië-veteranen zowel voorgangers als 
voorbeelden.”  
32 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 274 
33 Ibidem, 100 
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Shortly after the first ‘police action’ in 1947, international pressure under the 
leadership of the United Nations brought about a second agreement, which also 
did not survive long. In December 1948 and January 1949, the second Police 
Action began. This led to a suspension of the Marshall help for the Dutch-Indies. 
The US State Department even considered stopping post-war aid to the 
Netherlands completely in order to enforce concessions.34 This eventually worked 
and on December 27th, the Kingdom of the Netherlands withdrew from 
Indonesia.35  
 The sentiments in the Netherlands after all this were gloomy. In April 1948, 
32,5 percent of Dutch civilians expressed a desire to emigrate. Although these 
setbacks occurred between 1945-1948, the years to come would bring economic 
growth, employment possibilities, relatively low social inequality, the beginning 
of social security and an increase in educational participation.36 Around 1950, the 
damage of World War II was mostly restored. The Netherlands regained a strong 
international position, which led to considerable economic growth, which brought 
along employment for almost every Dutch citizen.37 
 Hoffenaar mentions the fact that little attention was paid to psychological 
care upon return, something that many of the returnees needed. Apparently the 
material reception of the soldiers had officially been up to standards, as was 
possible in the Netherlands during the postwar reconstruction years. Immaterial 
reception had been substandard, by the standards of today, due to little knowledge 
of PTSD and too little time and money. The Dutch were not very willing to listen 
to the stories of the veterans. This lack of attention did not necessarily sprout from 
an unwillingness to listen, but more so from a general misunderstanding.38 
The psychological consequences of fighting in a guerilla war, as they 
started to rise up decades after the veterans’ return, was something that had not 
been an important issue in the Netherlands, as well as in other countries, yet. 
                                                        
34 De Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog deel 12 Epiloog, 941-943 
35 De Rooy, ‘Een zoekende tijd.’, 260 
36 De Rooy, ‘Een zoekende tijd.’, 259-261 
37 Herman de Liagre Böhl,‘Consensus en polarisatie. Spanningen in de verzorgingsstaat, 1945-
1990’, in: Aerts, Remieg c.s., Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 
1780-1990 (Nijmegen/Amsterdam1999), 265-266  
38 Hoffenaar, ‘De terugkeer van de militairen‘, 128 
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Hoffenaar concludes that the material aid withstood the international test of 
critique, whereas immaterial assistance was lacking. Hoffenaar states that this 
lack of immaterial assistance could have been a considerable part of the 
frustrations of the veterans about the way they were received upon return.39 
In the book De Politionele Acties: afwikkeling en verwerking, edited by Jan 
Hoffenaar and Ger Teitler40, several authors contributed their view on the social 
settlement of the Indonesian war of independence. J.W.M. Schulten divides the 
problems of the demobilization into four subcategories; the medical and social 
care for those who got injured, financial relief, the psychological problems of the 
veterans that did not get addressed until much later after they had returned, and 
the need for recognition of what the soldiers had achieved in Indonesia for their 
government.41   
J.W.M. van Neden argues that the veterans were mostly bitter about the fact 
that they felt as if their time in the Dutch East Indies had been pointless. These 
feelings of discontent grew after the interview with Hueting and the publication 
of the excessennota, as less attention was paid to the veterans and their sacrifices, 
while at the same time; the use of excessive violence was a prominent point of 
discussion in the Netherlands.42 
J.A.A. van Doorn made a contribution to this book and notes that most of 
the Dutch soldiers had never before been to the Dutch East Indies, but all of them 
would remain emotionally attached to the fate of their host country, just like the 
three hundred thousand people of the Euro-Indonesian community that had to 
leave Indonesia for the Netherlands.43 
 
In 1996, eight years after Lou de Jong’s last account on the history of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, the data-research that was being conducted by dr. M. Boon 
and, later on, professor S. van der Wal, was finalized. However, this research was 
                                                        
39 Ibidem, 129 
40 G. Teitler and J. Hoffenaar (eds.) ,De Politionele Acties: afwikkeling en verwerking (Amsterdam 
1990) 
41 Schulten, ‘Het afgeschreven leger’, 91-101 
42 J.W. Van Neden, ‘De ontwikkeling van een veteranenprobleem’, in: Teitler and Hoffenaar (eds.) 
De Politionele Acties, 103-113 
43 J.A.A. Van Doorn, ‘De verwerking van het einde van Indië’, in: Ibidem, 115-127 
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not an actual reconstruction of this particular part of history, but rather a 
concatenation of official reports. It did not pass any judgment on the policies that 
were being applied at the time.44 
 The debate on the justness of Dutch military action in Indonesia during the 
war of independence started to flare up again in 2012, when the directors of three 
research institutes expressed the need for renewed research on the conflict via an 
article that appeared in the newspaper De Volkskrant in the month of June of that 
same year. These institutes were the NIOD (Nederlands Instituut voor 
Oorlogsdocumentatie; Dutch institute for War documentation) the KITLV 
(Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde; Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) and the NIMH (Nederlands 
Instituut voor Militaire historie; Dutch Institute for Military History). In the article, 
the question is raised why and how this war brought people to commit these 
atrocities that eventually were dubbed as ‘excesses’. The three directors note that 
the image that we have of these atrocities is merely fragmentary. One reason being 
that Indonesia has not opened up its archives yet. 45  These three institutions 
aspired to start a research project together, hoping to get funding from the 
government, as this period is an important part of Dutch history. In order to 
maintain or gain some sort of pride towards ‘our’ country, is argued, acts of 
depravity that are part of our history should be accepted as well. 46  Thorough 
research of the actual events in Indonesia during the period of 1945 and 1949 had 
never been conducted before in an all-encompassing manner. The Excessennota 
has been the most detailed up until then, and this only consists of fragments of 
source material, which did not present a complete image of this part of Dutch 
history.  
The article in De Volkskrant led to a reaction from three members of the 
Second Chamber, namely Harry van Bommel (Socialist Party), Mariko Peters  
                                                        
44 ‘De Excessennota’ in: Andere Tijden, VPRO (April 9th 2002) 
(http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2001-2002/De-
excessennota.html) Last consulted on 3rd of February 2017 
 
45 Gert Oostindie, e.a., ‘Onderzoek geweld Nederland in ‘Indië’’, De Volkskrant (19th June 2012) 
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46 Bregman, Rutger, ‘Analyse Voorstel nieuw onderzoek naar militaire acties Nederland in 
Indonesië 1945-1949’, De Volkskrant (19th  June 2012) 6 
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(Groenlinks/‘GreenLeft’) and Frans Timmermans (Labour Party). These three 
members supported the initiative to carry out extensive research of this part of 
Dutch history properly: ‘we recognize the fact that a complete picture of the past is 
without a doubt of great significance. This applies in particular to periods in our 
history that have been a topicality up until our present day.’47   
A few weeks later, on July 10th 2012, another article appeared, that showed 
photographs of executions that may have been conducted by the Dutch army in 
the Dutch East Indies. De Volkskrant published this on their front-page.48 After 
this, Van Bommel again stated that further research was of great importance. At 
the end of 2012, the government decided that funding would not be their 
responsibility and therefore would not be granted. One reason for this rejection 
was the fear of jeopardizing the Dutch relationship with Indonesia, whose 
government did not have any interest in reopening this painful part of history. 
Despite all this, research continued, albeit at a slower pace, but the topic of the 
Indies remained a ‘hot issue’. Next to the project of these three historical 
institutions (individually, as in a cooperative nature), lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld, for 
one, has been speaking, in lawsuits against the Dutch state, on behalf of Indonesian 
victims of violence committed by Dutch soldiers. This on-going case had again 
attracted attention from the Dutch public towards the issue of the Dutch East 
Indies.        
In December 2014 the KITLV organized a conference in order to share and 
exchange information and academic knowledge with leading international 
academics that did research in similar fields (i.e. decolonization, etcetera), in 
order to help propel their research further. This resulted in the book Soldaat in 
Indonesië 1945-1950. Getuigenissen van een oorlog aan de verkeerde kant van de 
geschiedenis (transl. ‘Soldier in Indonesia 1945-1950. Testimonies of a war on the 
wrong side of history’) by Gert Oostindie, which was published in October 2015. 
Oostindie concludes in this book, based on 659 egodocuments, in which 1362 
                                                        
47 Dr. minister U van Rosenthal, Buitenlandse Zaken, BRIEF VAN DE MINISTERS VAN   
BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN EN DEFENSIE Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-
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48 Nicolasen, Lidy, ‘Eerste beeld van executies in Indië: Fotoalbum Enschedese soldaat toont hoe 
Indonesiërs werden gedood’ In: De Volkskrant (10th July 2012) 1 
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soldiers contributed, that excessive violence happened structurally. He argues 
that there must have been as many as tens of thousands of incidents in which 
violence can be considered excessive.49 
In September 2016 historian Rémy Limpach published his book ‘De 
Brandende Kampong van Generaal Spoor’ (transl. ‘The burning Kampong of 
General Spoor’). In this book, Limpach draws the same conclusions as Oostindie 
by stating that, even though the majority of the soldiers who where send to the 
Dutch East Indies did not participate in excessive violence, it happened indeed 
structurally rather than incidentally. He added that the commanders in chief did 
not only allow this to happen, they even encouraged it.50 
Many of the Dutch soldiers that returned from the Dutch East Indies have 
already passed away, but the topic has again been hot for the past few years, due 
to the government deciding to subsidize new efforts by research institutions after 
all, to thoroughly map the events that took place in Indonesia during the war of 
independence.  
 
The previous analyses that focused more on the experiences of the soldiers than 
on government support were mainly aimed at the subject of excessive violence. 
The aim of these analyses was to use the experiences of the soldiers to draw a 
clearer picture of the situation. Whereas my research focused not specifically on 
gathering information on factual historical events that occurred, but on the 
apparent impact of some of these specific historical events or issues on the 
soldiers, which led to a collective narrative. My analysis adds a more psychological 
chapter to the historical narrative of the war. It shows which issues were 
significant burdens on the Dutch soldiers. By surfacing these burdens, the 
importance of military training and aftercare becomes apparent, and 
demonstrates its shortcomings in the case of the Dutch soldiers. The fact that 
specific subjects are dominant in the soldier’s stories signifies that there has been 
insufficient attention on a number of levels.   
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50 R. Limpach, De brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor (Amsterdam, 2016) 
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4. Material and Method 
 
I used egodocuments and interviews for this research.  
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In this chapter I will explain how I obtained and selected these sources, and how I 
analyzed them. How I selected the relevant sources and what aspects from these 
sources were helpful to understand the general sentiment of these soldiers. 
For a period of four months I analyzed 34 ego documents, 13 websites, and 
10 interviews at the KITLV. This institute focuses on the study of Southeast Asia 
and the Caribbean.51 The KITLV runs a project called “Dutch Military Operations 
in Indonesia, 1945-1950” in which their aim was to collect material on the subject, 
and to reconstruct the events that took place during the conflict. The KITLV holds 
an extensive collection of sources on the experiences of soldiers. The KITLV 
focused on Dutch military operations, including the use of violence, but also on 
how several authorities and other groups dealt with this conflict at the time, and 
afterwards. These authorities were the Dutch government, politicians and the 
military chain of command. Next to this, they analyzed sources on the actions of 
the Indonesian opponents, the nature of the conflict as well as the significance of 
the international military context. Finally, the project looked into the media and 
academic discourses in the course of time during and following the conflict, as well 
as veteran- and other involved organizations.52 This project resulted in a book that 
was published in 201553  
 
Egodocuments 
The egodocuments I studied consisted of diaries, memoires, letters, novels and 
collected stories.  
The entire corpus of egodocuments preserved in the archive of the KITLV 
consists of 659 published papers. In searching for the most relevant sources, I 
scanned the bibliography index at the KITLV. At first, I searched for diaries, 
because I felt that they should be more accurate in descriptions of experiences 
happening at the time. However, as it turned out, the largest part of the corpus 
consisted of memoirs. Next to this, most diaries I did find had little information 
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52 Website KITLV, ‘Projects’; ‘Dutch Military Operations in Indonesia, 1945-1950’ 
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about the soldiers returning home, a subject I felt was important to include in my 
research.  
I discovered that egodocuments that included descriptions of returning to 
the Netherlands were mostly reflective, and written years later. Most diaries 
stopped after describing the soldier’s arrival home by boat and the reunion with 
his family. In some diaries the experiences of returning home were mentioned in 
a reflective epilogue, but this was usually concise and somewhat superficial. This 
is why I based my research primarily on memoirs that were written decades later.  
I made a selection from the list of 659 published ego documents and tried 
to make an assessment of their content by interpreting the titles of the documents. 
I ended up with a large number of memoirs and only a few diaries with a reflective 
epilogue. I selected the most relevant documents by scanning the bibliographies, 
and looking at the bibliographical information, when available. If this information 
indicated that a document had significant content for my research, I would select 
and analyze it. This left me with 34 egodocuments, mostly memoirs. Next to these 
published documents, I also used a number of veteran websites that include 
stories of the Dutch soldiers. I collected 13 websites that I used for my research. 
Some websites presented the personal story of only one veteran, whereas others 
had a collection of extensive stories. Some other websites functioned as memorial 
sites with some short anecdotes. Including these websites, I used a total of 47 
egodocuments for my research. Firstly I analyzed the documents with another 
incentive; namely to find out if there was mention on the soldier’s return home. 
However, after reading a number of ego documents it struck me that these stories 
formed a more or less coherent collective narrative. After this, I decided to change 
the aim of my research, and collected stories based on similarities.  
 
Interviews 
The interviews I analyzed belong to the “Stichting Mondelinge Geschiedenis 
Indonesië” - collection. This digital catalogue consists of 1190 interview sessions 
with 724 people. The oral history project focused mainly on gathering information 
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about the end of the colonial Dutch presence in Asia. Since 2001, the entire 
collection is available for inquiry at the KITLV. 54  
Again, with the interviews I also started analyzing them with the incentive 
of finding out what was said on experiences with demobilization. When searching 
for relevant interviews, I used the very extensive digital database of the Stichting 
Mondelijke Geschiedenis Indonesië, which consists of concise summaries of all the 
interviews. This made it easy to find relevant material. I filtered on male soldiers 
of the Dutch Army. I used search terms such as ‘terugkeer’, ‘Nederland’, ‘Regering’, 
‘Overheid’,  ‘ontvangst’, and ‘ervaren’. From the 1190 interviews, I first made a 
selection of relevant interviewees; 222 were conducted with Dutch soldiers. I only 
used 10 interviews, mostly due to pragmatic reasons, but I believe that this is only 
a small part of the actual usable number of interviews. However, I already had 47 
egodocuments, and my access to the interview-database would be limited as the 
end of my internship was approaching. I also felt that with a collection of close to 
60 narratives, I would be able to make a well-grounded analysis.   
After selecting these interviews, I used transcriptions and summaries to 
scan them for the information I was looking for and, if relevant, I would listen to 
specific fragments of the interviews. If the fragments were usable for my research, 
I would listen to the entire interview to gain a better understanding of the soldier’s 
background. It adds to the value of these kinds of sources to actually listen to the 
veterans talking about a specific subject. Their voice might break, and indicate that 
some experiences are still haunting them, or they might struggle to reproduce a 
certain memory. By using this strategy, I was able to find the most relevant 
interviews, which became the 10 I eventually used. I eventually used these 10 
interviews to collect the similar stories of the soldiers, after I had decided to 
change the aim of my research. 
 
 
 
Source criticism 
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Egodocuments and interviews do not provide answers to all questions. 55  It is 
important to stay critical when reading or listening to these sources because there 
are many pitfalls. As these are merely snapshots of someone’s experiences, it is 
possible that this person will contradict himself later on, or that he will reflect on 
certain events differently as time goes by. Jacques Presser, who coined the term 
‘ego document’, defined it as words that both reveal and conceal. However, the 
author’s propensity to present a personal version of the actual historical facts is 
what makes ego documents interesting for historical research. Ego documents 
represent a personal, individual truth, in which objectivity and subjectivity are 
intertwined. 56  According to Arianne Baggerman and Rudolf Dekker, ego 
documents serve a significant part in supplying information about the social 
aspects of historical events. However, they argue, this is not the only potential of 
these kinds of sources. Analysis of ego documents can also lead to new questions 
or research subjects.57 Historians, who base their research on ego documents, do 
not always form a hypothesis beforehand after which certain sources are sought 
to verify or falsify information that is already known. Instead, the researchers 
allow themselves to be drawn into a striking aspect that exposed itself from 
studying certain ego documents after which they try to find explanations for these 
conspicuities.58  
 Diaries that were written during the events actually happening show 
different views than memoires written years later. If ego documents were written 
decades later, then it is possible that memories are distorted and interpretations 
have shifted.  The same goes for the interviews, which were mostly conducted in 
the late 1990s and consequently have a recollecting character whereby 
perceptions may have changed over the years. Next to this, due to different 
motivations of documenting certain events, it can be difficult to make a fair 
assessment of what went on during the described situations. Besides, if certain 
aspects are not mentioned, that does not mean that it did not happen or that it was 
not an issue. If we, for instance, were to look at excessive violence, we cannot make 
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an accurate assessment as to what extent excessive violence actually took place 
from the information that is presented to us. Letters that were sent home were 
often romanticized for instance; the real gist of what went on was rarely 
mentioned, most soldiers did not want to upset their families. Joop Hueting, 
psychologist and known for being among the first veterans publicly speaking 
about excessive violence in the Dutch East Indies, confirmed this by saying: ‘the 
people back home would just be worried. So you just wrote about the kampongs, the 
rice fields, the blue skies, the dark nights – I could just make up entire stories like 
that’.59  One of the interviews I used referred to this as well; ‘Of course we did not 
mention anything to the home front; you learned how to lie very quickly’.60  
The perceptions I present in this research are documented between 1981 and 
2015. It is not coincidental that there was a long silence before the 1980s and that 
I did not find any useful documents before that time. Surely there may be some 
within the 659 published ego documents that are kept in the archives of the KITLV. 
However, around 120 of them were put in a time of publication analysis by the 
KITLV, and only 7 of these 120 stories were documented before the 1980s.61 
Sources that were documented earlier were often diaries, instead of memoirs that 
are of a more reflecting nature. As I mentioned in my chapters on theory and 
historiography, it can be argued that this had everything to do with the fact that 
there had been none, if little attention to the Dutch soldiers and their experiences 
in the first few decades after the war of Independence. It was not until Huetings 
appearance in the news in the late sixties when the subject of this particular war 
was again revived.  
 
6. Findings from the analyzed sources 
 
                                                        
59  ‘De Excessennota’ in: Andere Tijden, VPRO (April 9th 2002) 
(http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2001-2002/De-
excessennota.html) Last consulted on 2nd of February 2017 
“Ook Joop Hueting had het 'grote zwijgen' in de jaren '50 en '60 ondervonden. Tijdens zijn 
tweejarige diensttijd in Indonesië schreef hij niet over de oorlogsmisdaden die hij en zijn bataljon 
begingen: 'De mensen thuis zouden er maar ongerust van worden. Je schreef over de kampongs, 
de rijstvelden, de blauwe luchten, de donkere nachten – ik kan zo hele verhalen aan elkaar rijmen'.”  
60 Mr. E. Nazarski; Utrecht 7th March 2015, Jolanda Linssen 
61 These numbers were presented by Gert Oostindie during a conference, which was organized 
by the KITLV in december 2014, to share and exchange information with international academics 
in order to help propel their research on the ego documents further. 
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I present my findings from analyzing the ego documents and the interviews I used. 
Firstly, I will make a subdivision in several categories that will show the overall 
perceptions of these soldiers throughout the whole experience; their expectations 
before leaving, experiences in the field, returning home, and opinions on (lack of) 
support by the Dutch government.  
I present the general outcomes of the sources I have analyzed. Per category I 
offer the most characteristic instances that are mentioned in the documents to 
underline these outcomes. I tried to be as complete as possible in introducing the 
different sources: such as their rank and age, although some sources do not 
provide background information such as date of birth, or are even written 
anonymously. I subdivided the soldiers in a few templates to rule out any 
significant divergences in the soldier’s stories based on different backgrounds and 
views. First of all there is a distinction between conscripted soldiers and 
volunteers. However, even though the reasons for joining the army differ, both of 
them had to go to war in the Dutch East Indies, the choices were not theirs to make. 
An example is Mr. Nazarski, whom I interviewed myself. He was a volunteer, 
which, in this case, is an example of how little this subcategory actually tells us 
about the soldier’s experiences, because in Mr. Nazarski’s case, it was a choice 
between having to face the court-martial due to (relatively minor) misdemeanors 
or going voluntarily to the Indies.62 The choice, therefore, was not entirely his 
own. And even though the majority of the documents I found were written by 
conscripted soldiers, it is a fact that both categories were in a completely new 
situation they never were fully prepared for. Merely the distinction conscripted 
vs. volunteering is too limited to make a coherent narrative of all these different 
sources. I therefore subdivided the storytellers in the following four templates: 
1. The spring chickens; soldiers leaving completely as a blank slate; these 
were often the first batch of soldiers, who did not have any idea of the 
situation in the Indies.  
                                                        
62 Mr. E. Nazarski; Utrecht 7th March 2015, Jolanda Linssen “[...]toen zei hij: ‘ik heb een oplossing, 
maar jij moet het goed vinden. Ik stuur je naar Indië’, zei hij.” “Maar dat was in de eerste instantie 
niet de bedoeling dus, dat u naar Indië ging?” “Nee. Daar ben ik vrijwillig naar toe gegaan. Ik had 
de keus: of krijgsraad of Indië.”  
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2. The second batch of soldiers; soldiers that went to the Dutch East Indies 
around ’47-’48, or even later. They already heard stories about the 
situation, and some of them became more critical about the whole ordeal.  
3. The soldiers of the Royal Dutch Army who experienced extreme violence, 
for instance during the bersiap period starting late 1945. This created an 
image of extremely barbaric opponents. These soldiers were not so much 
fighting for the cause as it was formulated by the government, but for their 
own lives being in constant danger, or avenging the lives of their comrades. 
Of course they had to follow orders and certain tactic moves, but their 
stories are written in a more apologetic role, especially towards any 
accusations of excessive violence. They present themselves as victims of 
these barbaric republicans.  
4. The soldiers who were compassionate to the cause of the republicans, who 
acknowledged and understood the fact that this was a protest against the 
occupation of their country, and who could envision themselves reacting 
the same. These soldiers were disappointed with the Netherlands and had 
difficulties accepting it as their home again. Some of these soldiers would 
soon after their return emigrate to Canada or Australia.  
The first subject that shows similarities in the narratives is the lack of 
preparations and training of the soldiers before they left for Indonesia. How did 
their military leaders and government prepare them and how did these 
preparations, or lack thereof, influence their expectations and ultimately, their 
experiences in Indonesia?  
 
Lack of preparation and information in the Dutch East Indies 
Almost all the sources note that the Dutch soldiers were very poorly informed 
about Indonesia and had no clue what to expect, irrespective of the template they 
fit in – this goes for all the soldiers. Military training was considered a joke, and 
reasons that were given by military leaders and the government were bluntly 
accepted. Generally, no questions were asked, whether soldiers were conscripted 
or volunteering and whether they were first-batch soldiers or second-batch 
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soldiers. Any critical observations would not come to the surface until they had 
actually experienced the situation over there.  
In Stef Scagliola’s dissertation on Dutch war crimes in Indonesia, Last van 
de Oorlog, she, among other things, tries to envelop the factors that were of 
influence on the derailment of violence towards the Indonesian opponents.63 She 
mentions the physical and mental pressure on the soldiers and the fact that 
information was scarce. Next to this, the basic preconditions for a fully operating 
military organization were lacking. In the ego documents as well as the interviews, 
these impaired conditions are mentioned in almost all of them, and perceived as 
affecting them in their role as soldier. The soldiers did not have a proper training 
to fight a guerrilla war in a foreign country. They usually only had one day of 
preparation for this new culture, climate and enemy, and were often instructed by 
someone who had not even been to the Dutch East Indies. 
‘The preparation, medical as well as psychological, and the information about 
Indonesia was minimal. Instructions on the different tropical diseases and hygiene 
were superficial. […] Psychological preparation was also limited. Little, or no 
attention was given to the political background. We had to go to Indonesia because 
it was our duty to fight for our Queen and homeland. Who our enemies were, was not 
revealed. Our main task was to drive out the ‘occupiers’, whomever they were, and 
to restore peace and order.’64 
In one of the interviews, the interviewee Jan van Beurden, who was a 
conscripted corporal soldier, part of the second batch of soldiers, and in his early 
twenties when he was in Indonesia, mentioned this as well. He was interviewed 
on July 14th 2000, when he stated that even when negotiations were happening 
with the United Nations, and even when there was mention of a date of cessation 
of hostilities, he and his fellow Dutch soldiers were not aware of what was going 
on politically. All they heard were rumors that ‘things were happening’. ‘As regular 
                                                        
63 Stef Scagliola, Last van de Oorlog, 90 
64 Nico van den Bergh en Constant van Casteren, Respect en erkenning: Veteranen Schaijk-Reek in 
Nederlands-Indië 1945-1950 (Z.P. 2001), 177 ‘De voorbereiding, zowel medisch als psychologisch, 
en de informatie over Indonesië was minimaal. De voorlichting over de verschillende tropische 
ziekten en de hygiëne betrof enkele oppervlakkige zaken. […] De psychologische voorbereiding 
was evenmin toereikend. Aan de politieke achtergronden werd weinig of geen aandacht besteed. 
We moesten naar Indonesië omdat het onze plicht was voor Koningin en vaderland te vechten.. 
Wie onze vijanden waren, werd niet uit de doeken gedaan. Hoofdzaak was de ‘bezetters’, wie dit 
ook mochten zijn, te verjagen en de vrede en orde te handhaven.’ 
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soldiers in the jungle we were not aware of what exactly was going on.’65  These 
experiences are not exceptional; they are mentioned in most, if not all of the 
documents and interviews. I never came across a storyteller who specifically 
mentioned anything positive about the preparations before leaving for the Indies.  
Mr. Van Druten, who served as a chaplain and was twenty-five when he left 
for Indonesia in 1947, also backed this notion of lack of information and false 
pretenses during an interview: ‘we all felt like we had been there completely for 
nothing. All those deaths were in vain. And I still maintain this point of view today. It 
hadn’t been necessary. If generals and politicians would have agreed more with each 
other… but I did not read about that stuff until much later: that there had always 
been such friction between the Dutch political leaders and the generals in Indonesia. 
[…] and we always had to listen to remarks that we were there for a just cause, which 
we already stopped believing back in 1947. But we were law-abiding, ecclesiastical, 
always abiding to any form of authority. That’s how we all were.’66  
Mr. Van Druten is part of the second batch, which not only becomes apparent from 
the fact that he left for the Indies in 1947, but also from this citation. He claims 
here that he and his fellow soldiers were already suspicious of the reasons for 
being there, they were more critical than the first batch of soldiers, but, 
nonetheless, they did what they were told and were not enough aware of what 
exactly was going on in the political background in order to object or speak up.  
                                                        
65J.C. Van Beurden, 14th July 2000, Theo Boiten, Stichting Mondelijke Geschiedenis Indonesië 
(SMGI) The event in this citation is approximated by van Beurden to april 1949: “Toen eenmaal de 
besprekingen met mensen van de Verenigde Naties goed op gang kwamen en er al gesproken werd 
over een datum van het staken van de vijandelijkheden, vanaf dat moment werden er in 
brigadeverband of vanuit de divisie geen grote acties meer georganiseerd. “ 
“Maar wisten jullie toen ook dat dat soort dingen op de achtergrond allemaal gaande waren?” 
“Nee, nee. Wij hoorden bij geruchten dat er dingen gebeurden, en als het je lukte om eens een 
keer een Nederlandse krant die op Java verscheen, bijvoorbeeld De Locomotief, dat was een 
krant die kwam geloof ik uit in, die werd gedrukt in Semarang. Daar kwamen wij dan wel eens 
van aan de weet dat er iets gaande was, maar hoe dat dan precies in elkaar stak, daar hadden wij 
geen kijk op. Als gewoon soldaat in de rimboe wisten wij niet wat er allemaal precies gebeurde.”   
66 H.J. van Druten, October 2, 1997, Theo Boiten, Stichting Mondelijke Geschiedenis Indonesië 
(SMGI) “We hadden ook helemaal het gevoel: ‘we zijn hier he-le-maal voor niks geweest. Al die 
doden zijn er voor niks geweest.’ En dat blijf ik nóg volhouden. Het had niet nodig geweest. Als 
generaals en politici het wat beter met elkaar eens waren geweest. Maar dat heb ik allemaal pas 
later gelezen. Dat er altijd zo’n wrijving was tussen de politieke leiders in Nederland en de 
generaals in Indië.” […] “Dat hebben we ook wat moeten aanhoren hoor. Dat we daar voor een 
goeie taak waren, en, nou dat geloofden we in ’47 al niet meer. Maar ja, nogmaals, goed rechts, 
politiek gezagsgetrouw, kerkelijk, allemaal buigen voor het gezag wat boven ons staat. Ja, zo 
waren wij. Allemaal.” 
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The preparation of the soldiers was soaked with colonial indoctrination, as 
spreading colonial-conservative magazines and brochures held up the image of 
the importance of military intervention. Leo Mossink, who was a first batch soldier 
and part of the so-called “7 December division” that left for the Indies in 1946, 
underscores the lack of information, and the indoctrination in his memoirs, which 
are published on the website of this particular division where several stories of its 
members are collected. He stated: ‘when we went to the Dutch East Indies, it was to 
restore peace and order. Upon return I received the ‘honor sign for peace and order’ 
with four buckles. Indoctrinated, already starting in the primary school benches, we 
left for ‘OUR Indië’. Later, after we had been back for a long while, I realized that we 
had no business there. Just like the Germans here in 1940-1945, we were over there 
the occupiers. Those people also had the right to freedom. Even though good things 
happened as well. Because, apart from the republican troops, there were also 
different groups like the Daroel Islam, Laskar Rajat and gangs that robbed and 
looted and had nothing to do with the ideal of freedom.’67 
 
Experiences in the Dutch East Indies 
An example of how the information the soldiers received before and during their 
stay in the Dutch East Indies was of influence on their experiences there, is a 
brochure from the KNIL from 1945 that stated that the ‘Indonesians should be 
treated with self control and politeness, to never lose patience with them and yell 
or grope at them. It also explicitly mentions how the inhabitants ‘should be 
considered as a people in the process of development.’68 Statements such as these 
                                                        
67 Leo Mossink, Geschiedenis trekt zo zijn sporen, www.7decemberdivisie.nl  (2002) Last 
consulted on 3rd February 2017, 22 “Toen we naar Nederlands Indië gingen was dat om orde en 
vrede te herstellen. Ik heb er het “Ereteken voor orde en vrede” met vier gespen voor gekregen. 
Geïndoctrineerd, vanaf de lagere schoolbanken, gingen we naar ONS Indië. 
Later toen we al lang terug waren ben ik tot inzicht gekomen dat we er niets te maken hadden. 
Evenals de Duitsers hier in 1940 - 1945, waren wij daar de bezetters. Dat volk had ook recht op 
vrijheid. Hoewel er in de tijd dat we er waren ook goede dingen gebeurd zijn. Want behalve de 
republikeinse troepen waren er ook andere groepen zoals de Daroet Islam, Laskar Rajat en 
bendes die roofden en plunderden en niets met het vrijheidsideaal te maken hadden.  
68 Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië, 70: “[…]‘den Indonesiër [sic] te behandelen met zelfcontrole en 
beleefdheid, nimmer het geduld te verliezen en tegen hem te gaan schreeuwen of handtastelijk te 
worden.’ “[…] en worden de militairen opgeroepen de bevolking ‘te beschouwen als een volk in 
opkomst.’ 
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would create a distance between the soldiers and the inhabitants, and a distorted 
view. This distance is for example mentioned by a conscripted, first batch soldier, 
J. Westra: ‘The inhabitants and us both have long and sensitive toes (Dutch 
expression ‘lange tenen’, meaning easily offended), and due to distrust, 
misunderstanding and antipathy we keep stepping on each others toes even more.’69  
This distorted view entails the idea that the Indonesian inhabitants are less 
developed than Westerners. An example is mentioned by Hans Post, a first batch 
soldier who stated in his diary, as a reaction to an Indonesian soldier stating that 
it would be a waste of money to nurse the wounded: ‘A human life apparently has 
less meaning in Indonesia than, for example, in the Netherlands. I have heard certain 
statements from several Indonesians […]. What would become of these people, if we 
would abandon them? Who would teach them clean values […]? The Netherlands 
also has a cultural task to attend to in this country.’70  
 
 A.S. van Cleeff, who went to the Dutch East Indies in 1947, which makes him a 
second batch soldier, had a more nuanced view of the inhabitants: ‘Simple people 
with only little needs, but…PEOPLE like us. They also have their religion, their 
marital lives, the battle to exist and their, […] sense of art. They are people like us 
with the same human tendencies and needs.’71  
In reflecting on their time in the Dutch East Indies almost all of the ego documents 
and interviews I’ve studied show not only traumatized experiences, but also 
beautiful and pleasant events. This obviously differs from one person to another: 
depending to what extent they were faced with danger and violence, but also 
depending on their personality and upbringing. One of the interviewees for 
                                                        
69 J. Westra, Jongvolwassen in de knel: Dientsplicht in Indië 1946-1950: Dagboekuittreksels (Z.P. 
1992) 56: ‘De inlanders en wij hebben beide lange en gevoelige tenen en door wantrouwen, niet 
begrijpen en antipathie gaan we steeds maar weer elkaar op de tenen staan.’ 
70 Hans Post, Politionele actie (Medan 1948) 64: ‘Een mensenleven heeft in Indonesië schijnbaar 
veel minder waarde dan bijvoorbeeld in Nederland Ik heb meermalen iets dergelijks van 
Indonesiërs gehoord als net van Soekiman. Wat zou er van dit volk worden, als wij het aan zijn lot 
overlieten? Wie zou het ooit de schone waarden leren, waar toch elk beschaafd volk, als deze 
waarden bedreigd worden, een oorlog voor wil beginnen? Nederland is ook een culturele taak in 
dit land begonnen. Deze taak zal vervuld moeten worden.’ 
71 A.S. van Cleeff, Een jaar in de tropen, 4 Augustus 1948-1949: Het werk en leven van 6 R.S. in 
woord en beeld (Z.P. 1949) 30: ‘Eenvoudige mensen met weinig behoeften maar… MENSEN als 
wij. Zij hebben ook hun godsdienst, hun liefdesverlangens, hun huwelijksleven, hun 
bestaansstrijd en hun, door bepaalde factoren sterk ontwikkelde kunstgevoelens. Het zijn 
mensen als wij met dezelfde menselijke neigingen en dezelfde behoeften.’ 
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instance, Mr. Eduard Nazarski, who was a first-batch volunteer in the air force of 
the Dutch army, stated that he had seen terrible things, but overall, he cherished 
his time spent there. And to the question whether or not he was haunted by 
traumas afterwards, he dismissed the idea. He stated that he could not identify 
with his fellow soldiers who had to get professional help and that they should try 
to forget about what happened over there.72  
Be that as it may, all of the soldiers that were represented in the analyzed 
sources did encounter a lot of dangerous situations in which they had to act in a 
way they never considered themselves capable of.  As mentioned earlier, the 
soldiers did not have a proper training to arrive fully prepared to fight a guerrilla 
war in a foreign country. Adding to this was the fact that facilities were usually 
very poor, which often made the men take goods from inhabitants. Scagliola also 
mentions the fact that there was not enough manpower to relief the soldiers from 
their duties on regular basis. Not only did this cause exhaustion of the body as well 
as the mind, it also made the men – especially towards the end – more desperate 
to spend their last months in safety. After three years of surviving, their methods 
of getting that particular job done would often become morally blurred. This is 
particularly the case for those soldiers who felt victimized by the ‘brutal’ 
opponents, and faced a lot of excessive violence during their years in the Indies. 
Prosper Ego, who left for Indonesia as a conscripted soldier at the age of twenty, 
after which he became a right-wing conservative political activist, underlines this 
in his own words: ‘[…] will I ever see them again back home? And we had already 
decided on selling our life dearly, because those ‘peloppers’ were not exactly known 
as sweethearts either’. 73 
As is shown in most historical accounts, and is therefore a recurring aspect of the 
collective narrative of these soldiers, is the fact that not only was there not enough 
manpower, there were also too few soldiers to guard prisoners of war that were 
                                                        
72 Mr. E. Nazarski, Utrecht, 7th March 2015, Jolanda Linssen. “[..]en dan zei ik van: ‘onnozele 
mannen’, […] loop de eerste de beste kroeg binnen, ga aan het buffet zitten, […] praat tegen het 
meisje aan of de vrouw die daar staat, […], en je drinkt stevig een paar bier, en alles is voorbij. En 
dan zeiden ze: ‘jij bent gek.’” 
73 V. Dumas, Een Man van Sta-Vast: Prosper Ego, De inzet voor vrijheid en veiligheid (2008) 74 ‘'zou 
ik ze thuis ooit nog een keer terugzien? En een voornemen had je bij voorbaat al gemaakt, namelijk 
je huid zo duur mogelijk verkopen, ook al omdat de peloppers niet bepaald als lieverdjes 
bekendstonden.” 
 40 
captured along the way. They had no facilities to keep them and care for them, so 
they were often executed. Also the deficiency in facilities to achieve a correct legal 
procedure was lacking and therefore summary executions took place on a regular 
basis as well. Another factor was the lack of independent interpreters to 
interrogate prisoners of war. These are also aspects that are confirmed in half of 
the ego documents and interviews – mostly in those accounts that were written 
by the more critical storytellers; those who, to some extent, sympathized (in many 
cases their sympathy did not come up until after they had returned to the 
Netherlands) with the republican cause and were in their stories not afraid to be 
self-critical as well.  
It is difficult to argue that linguistic difficulties with prisoners may have 
been a direct cause of how these prisoners were treated, but there is, however, 
mention of misunderstanding resulting in unnecessary abuse. Jan Glissenaar, a 
first batch soldier who left for the Indies in 1946 and first started out as a corporal 
and later on as a deputy platoon commander, mentions in his memoires how he 
captured a suspicious man burning a fire in a hole, right next to their quarters. At 
first they thought the guy meant mischief, and after not being able to understand 
him due to a lack of knowledge of the Indonesian language, they called a superior 
officer for help. Glissenaar noticed that the officer’s Indonesian was even worse 
than his. The officer started hitting the prisoner for not talking, and believed it to 
be a ‘Republican’s trick to send someone of such low intelligence’. However, after 
retrieving someone else, it was quickly learned that the prisoner did not speak 
Indonesian but Sundanese, the language that is spoken in West Java. 74  The 
language issue was also mentioned in my interview with Mr. Nazarski. When 
asked how they were prepared for Indonesia, he stated that they would get a piece 
of A-4 sized paper with some information and a few words Indonesian which were 
of no use, because of all the different dialects that were spoken in each region.    
                                                        
74 Jan Glissenaar, Terug naar Java; In het spoor van politionele acties (Aalsmeer 1992) 12-14: ‘“Ik 
versta niets van het gesprek, maar De Korte wordt steeds heftiger. Hij stoot herhaaldelijk met de loop 
van zijn pistool de man tegen de borst en kijkt hem daarbij met een dreigend gezicht aan. Maar 
tenslotte zegt hij: ‘Een doodonschuldige vent. Iemand van buiten die naar de stad kwam om een paar 
boodschappen te doen. In het donker durfde hij niet meer terug. Hij had geen geld om in een warung 
te gaan slapen. Daarom wilde hij in die kuil blijven. Dat vuurtje stookte hij om zich ’n beetje te warmen 
en de muskieten te verdrijven. Dat doen die inlanders wel meer. De man had absoluut niet de 
bedoeling om dat huis in brand te steken.’  
 Terwijl we de wijk in lopen denk ik met schaamte aan die gebeurtenis terug’ 
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 The third and fourth templates are very distinctive in the narratives that 
elaborate on the experiences concerning undergoing and perpetrating violence. 
Some of the veterans realized that part of the things they did were point blank 
wrong (the fourth template – i.e. the (self-) critical and the, albeit often in 
hindsight, compassionate soldiers), whereas others tended more towards the idea 
that ‘we were young and did not know what we were doing’, or that they had to 
do it in order to survive, or to pay them back for the terrible things they did to 
their fellow soldiers (the third template – i.e. ‘the victims’). Hans Post, falls within 
this fourth template as he states: ‘I don’t like killing, just like many other soldiers 
I’ve been hanging out with in this country. Killing is an extreme measure. No one 
takes this lightly, but sometimes it is unavoidable.’75 Or as Sjeng Cox states: ‘Nothing 
is as dirty as a war. If you haven’t experienced it, you cannot understand it. If we 
were looking for extremists, you would stick the barrel of your weapon around the 
door and just shoot. And sometimes you would hit the wrong [person]. You can’t do 
anything about that. It happens.’76  
B. Faber, on the other hand, is part of the fourth template, as he tries to justify his 
actions. ‘Even if judgment of our actions in Indonesia would turn out negatively, it 
would not change the fact that we were doing our patriotic duty. We made mistakes, 
especially according to today’s standards. We do not mean to obscure those mistakes 
and we do not want to hide behind the well-known ‘Befehl ist Befehl’, but we most 
certainly did not serve our own interest. […] every insinuation of Nazi-practices we 
importunately reject. In every society there are good people and bad people. In times 
of war, under stress, there are extra good and extra bad people. That’s how it was 
with us. But, unlike the Nazi’s, systematic violence and crimes stimulated and 
ordered from the chain of command was not in question.’ 77   
                                                        
75 Post, Politionele acties, 95 
76 Marleen Wegman, “Niets is zo vies als een oorlog”: Indië-veteraan Sjeng Cox is blij met late 
erkenning’ in: Checkpoint 8-9: Wel en wee der A.A.T. (Z.P. 2007), 28: ‘Er is niets zo vies als een 
oorlog. Als je het niet hebt meegemaakt, kun je het ook niet begrijpen. Als wij op zoek waren naar 
extremisten, stak je de loop van je wapen rond een deur en je schoot. En dan raakte je wel eens 
de verkeerde. Daar kun je niets aan doen. Dat gebeurt.’ 
77 B. Faber c.s., Het Derde - Belevenissen van een infanterie-peloton op Zuid-Sumatra 1947-1950 
(Delft 1981) 7: “Tenslotte nog een teer punt, wat ons allen ter harte gaat en waar wij niet omheen 
kunnen en willen. “Wij werden geroepen” was het devies van de 7 December-divisie. Dat gold 
onverkort voor de divisies die later kwamen. Het is ons niet in dank afgenomen. Wij werden niet 
als bevrijders binnengehaald in Indië (uitgezonderd in Belitang misschien). Later ontstond ook in 
Nederland hier en daar onbegrip en verguizing. Dat deed pijn. Zelfs indien een oordeel over ons 
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This comparison with Nazi’s is something that is mostly pointed out in stories by 
soldiers who were not afraid to be critical of their own troop’s actions towards the 
republicans. ‘It’s rotten to act like this. I’m terribly reluctant. You start to look like 
the Germans in the war so much’ 78  Other soldiers, like B. Faber for instance, 
mentioned the Nazis to show they were better than that: we did things we 
shouldn’t have, sure, but we were not as bad as the Nazi’s. The soldiers who 
victimized themselves would pertinently dismiss these comparisons, as is the case 
in the above citation by Faber.   
 
Dealing with the experiences of the war back in the Netherlands 
The Dutch soldiers were stationed in Indonesia for three, sometimes even four 
years or longer. Most of them longed to go back, to see their loved ones and to pick 
up their lives where they left off. When they came back home, most of them were 
welcomed with flags and music and were cheered by family and friends. It would 
not, however, take long before the veterans noticed a certain lack of 
understanding, or grasp of what they had experienced for the last couple of years.  
In the ego documents, as well as in the interviews, there is sometimes 
mention of a certain sense of annoyance with the petty problems that were 
present in the daily life of average Dutch citizens and the shallow interest in 
materialism. This is not a recurring theme in all of them as in some sources this is 
not mentioned specifically, but it is most obvious in the stories written by the 
fourth category of soldiers, the compassionate soldiers, because they tend to 
compare this Dutch mentality to the poor situation of the Indonesian people. 
Those soldiers who were struck with the situation of the Indonesian locals, and 
felt for the cause of the republicans, even though they were often against their 
                                                        
optreden achteraf (en dat is zo gemakkelijk) negatief zou uitvallen, dan nog werd door ons een 
vaderlandse plicht vervuld. Ook door ons werden fouten gemaakt, zeker naar de maatstaven die 
men nu meent te moeten aanleggen, al schuilt daar natuurlijk een grove onbillijkheid in. Die 
fouten willen wij heus niet verdoezelen. Wij willen ook niet wegkruipen achter het  “Befehl ist 
Befehl”. Maar eigenbelang hebben wij niet gediend. […]“Elke insinuatie van nazi-praktijken 
willen wij met kracht van de hand wijzen. In elke samenleving zijn goede en slechte mensen. In 
tijd van oorlog, onder hoogspanning, zijn er extra goede en extra slechte mensen. Zo was het ook 
bij ons. Maar, zoals bij de nazi’s, van systematische van hogerhand gestimuleerde en bevolen 
misdaden, was geen sprake.” 
78 H. Zwart, Er waren er die niet gingen: Vijftien eeuwen straf voor Indonesië-weigeraars 
(Amsterdam 1995) 137: ‘Het is rot om zo te doen. Ik heb er vreselijke tegenzin in. Je begint zo op 
de Duitsers in de oorlog te lijken.’ 
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methods. One returning soldier mentions how he, upon return, was given a new 
bike and watch from the entire neighborhood. He states that he could not care less 
about these presents; all he longed for was to see his little cousins for the first 
time.79  
Some soldiers, who felt that little sympathy was to be found in the Netherlands 
regarding the Indonesian people, even left the Netherlands after a while, not just 
because of this, but also because it contributed to the fact that they felt completely 
misunderstood. They were embittered. They emigrated to Australia or Canada to 
start over.  
An example of these specific storytellers is ‘soldier Kees’ who appeared in 
one of the ego-documents edited by Anton P. De Graaff who presented selected 
works of several soldiers anonymously. He left for Canada after being repeatedly 
disappointed in Dutch government and society: 
‘When our soldiers were only shortly there [in Indonesia, ed.] a truce was initiated 
with the Republic. Part of this agreement was, that the kampongs were to be given 
back to the Republic. Our boys were very angry because of this, because they were 
pretty sure that the Christian population was going to be punished for being friendly 
with us. There were even rumors about possible murders! Some of our soldiers wrote 
to churches in the Netherlands and Indonesia with the request to help these people. 
[…] The answer the boys got was that the churches did not have any money to help 
these people, which automatically meant that these people were to be abandoned 
and left with their fate. Not long after we left the area, we heard that right after we 
left many Christians were murdered and that their houses and possessions were 
burned down…What made me angry, was that around that same time my father 
proudly wrote to me how the Reformed church in Nieuw-Vennep had allocated 100 
000 guilders to build a beautiful new church with a parsonage for the vicar. […] I did 
not want to talk about this when I was in Indonesia, but after I returned to the 
                                                        
79A.P. de Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden (2003) 14: "een jongen schrijft: 'meer voor de familie 
en bezoekers dan voor mij. Nieuwe fiets - horloge van de buurt: het doet me niets. Het leukste 
vind ik mijn kleine neefjes en nichtje, die ik voor het eerst zie.'” 
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Netherlands, I was accused of overreacting, which eventually was one of the reasons 
I finally fled to France and later on to Canada.’ 80  
These were already the first signs of the gap that would only grow bigger between 
the returning soldiers and the Dutch citizens that stayed at home. In the weeks to 
come it became clearer that most of these young veterans did not have anywhere 
to go to with their stories. Not professionally, and not privately. They were, in their 
experience, merely expected to go on with their lives, and not discuss what 
happened in the Dutch East Indies. ‘Soldier Ad’ mentions in this same ego 
document consisting of a collection of stories: ‘the experiences we had over there 
in the Indies, we pretty much kept to ourselves. It was ‘not done’ to talk about that. 
Returning soldiers received only little sympathy from the Dutch government as well. 
Their future, as it turned out, was subordinate to political and financial 
consideration by the government. No whining… buckle down! So that’s what I did, 
and I did my part, but ever since I have had it with the Dutch government.’81 
Soldier Ad was not the only one; most of the former soldiers felt let down 
by the Dutch government and it was not exceptional that re-settling turned out to 
be quite a challenge. This sentiment occurs in the majority of the documents and 
interviews I analyzed; irrespective of the soldier, whether they were first batch 
                                                        
80 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 22: “ Toen onze soldaten er nog maar kort waren, werd 
er een wapenstilstand met de Republiek gesloten. Onderdeel van de overeenkomst was, dat de 
kampongs aan de Republiek moest worden teruggegeven. Onze jongens waren hier erg kwaad 
over, omdat ze er vrij zeker van waren dat de christelijke bevolking ervoor gestraft zou worden 
dat ze zo vriendelijk met ons waren omgegaan, en er werd zelfs gesproeken over de mogelijkheid 
van moord! Sommigen van onze soldaten schreven aan kerken in Nederland en in Indonesië met 
het verzoek deze mensen te helpen […]. 
Het antwoord dat de jongens kregen, was dat de kerken geen geld hadden om deze mensen te 
helpen en dat betekende dus automatisch dat ze aan hun lot werden overgelaten. Niet lang nadat 
we het gebied verlaten hadden, hoorden we dat na ons vertrek christenen waren vermoord en 
dat hun huisjes en bezittingen waren verbrand… 
Wat mij woedend maakte, was dat mijn vader mij omstreeks dezelfde tijd trots schreef dat de 
Gereformeerde Kerk in Nieuw-Vennep ƒ 100.000 had uitgetrokken voor de bouw van een 
prachtige nieuwe kerk met een pastorie voor de dominee, dit terwijl Leo, de communist, deze 
mensen op alle mogelijke manieren had willen helpen.[…] Ik wilde hier niet over spreken toen ik 
in Indonesië was, maar toen ik erover wilde spreken toen ik terug in Holland was, werd ik ervan 
beschuldigd de zaken te overdrijven, en dat werd een van de redenen waarom ik naar Frankrijk 
vluchtte en later naar Canada.” 
81 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 116:  Soldaat Ad’: “De ervaringen daar in Indië opgedaan, 
hebben we maar voor ons gehouden. Het was ‘not done’ om daarover te praten. Van de kant van 
de Nederlandse regering ontvingen terugkerende militanten weinig sympathie. Hun toekomst 
bleek, zoals zo vaak, ondergeschikt aan politieke en financiële overwegingen van de overheid. Niet 
zeuren… schouders eronder! Dat heb ik dan ook maar gedaan en ik heb mijn boontjes gedopt, maar 
vanaf die tijd kan de overheid voor mij de boom in.” 
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soldiers, second batch soldiers, victimized soldiers or compassionate soldiers. The 
majority of them described how they felt insufficiently taken care of by their 
government. In the editorial epilogue of the diary by conscripted soldier Hein 
Peeters, the main point he makes is the fact that the home front just wanted to 
forget about everything and that the returnees would get a warm welcome: a 
triumphal arch, a new bike, a warm speech, and then the book of this past episode 
of the Dutch-Indies was closed unceremoniously. So there was only a small 
window of care and attention towards them and their experiences. ‘The home front 
has kept the same image for years, which is that the boys did their duty, they 
conducted good and great work, and even if there had been any signals of it being a 
dirty war reaching Baarlo, then all aspects that would only slightly impair the old 
familiar image that we, the Dutch, were the best colonial lords, would be wiped off. 
Losing the colony would lead to jostling the past, which is why no one would ask the 
question ‘why all this?’82  
This particular question of ‘why’ and ‘was it worth it’ is something that 
ninety five percent of the ego documents asked. In none of the documents is this 
stated otherwise, but the remaining percentage does not mention this at all. 
Therefore, it is safe to argue that this perception of the war was dominant amongst 
the Dutch soldiers. Jos Koenen, whose father served in the Dutch East Indies, 
concludes in his contribution to understanding this episode of our history that the 
goal of going to Indonesia was no more than securing the Netherlands’ pre-war 
privileges on a financially-economical level. ‘It is a profound tragedy that, due to 
this goal, hundreds of Dutch militaries and thousands of Indonesians lost their lives. 
In my opinion the deployment of the Dutch soldiers and implementation of both 
police actions are ethically, politically, economically and strategically 
unacceptable.’83 
                                                        
82 P.J.G. Schinck, ‘En weer werd de vijand verslagen’: dagboek Hein Peeters, Tjipanas 21 juli 1947: de 
Baarlose jongens in Indië 1945-1950 (Baarlo 1999) 170: “Het thuisfront behoudt al jaren het beeld 
dat de jongen hun plicht doen, goed en groots werk verrichten, en mochten er al enkele signalen 
zijn van een vuile oorlog Baarlo bereiken, dan worden alle zaken die het oude vertrouwde beeld, 
dat wij Nederlanders de beste koloniaalheren zijn, ook maar enigszins aantasten, snel en 
eendrachtig door autoriteiten en het Thuisfront weggepoetst. 
Men verdringt snel het verlies van de kolonie in de Oost en dat leidt er tenslotte toe dat men niet 
alleen de vraag van ‘waarom dit alles?’ niet stelt, nee, men wenst zich er ook niet mee bezig te 
houden […].” 
83 J. Koenen, De Politionele acties, feiten en meningen (Wognum 2010) 137-138: “Mijns inziens was 
het doel niet meer of minder dan het veiligstellen van vooroorlogse privileges op financieel-
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 The dissatisfaction with the initial reasons for being in the Indies becomes 
very clear from the analyzed sources. And they all felt that the way they were 
appreciated back in the Netherlands was insufficient and disappointed them 
greatly. This caused them to struggle with reconnecting to their home. In the diary 
of A. van Helvoort, a second batch corporal who served in Indonesia from 1947 
until 1950, is also mentioned that he could not find solid ground back in Dutch 
society after he returned, regardless of the initial welcoming ceremonies and 
attention: ‘In the evening the concert band came by for a serenade, and the 
neighborhood had bought me a second hand bicycle. We received six weeks of paid 
leave, one hundred guilders extra and an additional payment of thirty-five cents per 
day for the entire time we had been in the tropics, including danger money. On May 
21th [1950, ed.] I received a message that I had become effective sergeant. After my 
leave I went back to my old civilian employer, but I just couldn’t find my way at my 
old job. […] In 1958, I eventually decided to go back into the army. I just couldn’t find 
my place in society and just conflicted with everybody.’ 84  
It was not just the sense of having lost one’s roots in society, which is an 
undisputable and an intrinsic part of belonging to a community, but many even 
suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder. Some were diagnosed soon after, 
others not until years, even decades, later.  
Thé van der Logt, a conscripted soldier who was twenty years old when he 
left for Indonesia in 1947, mentions in his memoires ‘De Kist’, how he woke up 
screaming after he had returned home to his parents. ‘I did not forget about those 
days in the Dutch East Indies. The things that happened there, I relived in my sleep. 
My mother would then show up next to my bed wondering what was wrong. She 
                                                        
economisch gebied. Het is diep tragisch dat omwille van dit doel honderden Nederlandse 
militairen en duizenden Indonesiërs het leven lieten. Naar mijn overtuiging was de uitzending van 
de Nederlandse militairen en het uitvoeren van de beide acties ethisch, politiek, financieel-
economisch en strategisch onaanvaardbaar.”  
 
84 A. van Helvoort, Vergeten oorlog: Dagboek van een hospik in Indië 1947-1950 (Groningen 1988) 
177 ‘’’s Avonds kwam de harmonie een serenade brengen; van de buurt kreeg ik een 
nieuwgemoffelde tweedehands fiets. We kregen zes weken betaald verlof, honderd gulden extra 
en een nabetaling van vijfendertig cent per dag voor de tijd dat we in de tropen gezeten hadden, 
inclusief gevarengeld. Op 21 mei [1950] kreeg ik bericht dat ik effectief sergeant geworden was.  
Na mijn verlof ging ik terug naar mijn oude burgerbaas, maar kon er mijn draai net vinden. Ik ging 
nog twee keer op herhaling om te leren hoe een noodverband aangelegd moest worden. In 1958 
besloot ik maar terug te gaan in het leger. Ik kon in de maatschappij niet aarden en botste met 
iedereen.’  
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would stand there, just like in my childhood, when I dreamed I was falling in the 
water well. She would always show up at my bed when I screamed at night. […] When 
she asks me today what is the matter, I do not tell her. Even in my letters I never 
wrote about those horrible events in the Indies. But she did discover some of it in the 
photo’s she looked at. And if she were to show up at my bed again at night she would 
say: “I can’t help you, but maybe with a lot of prayer and hard work it will pass?”85 
Thé is already haunted by traumas shortly after his return. His mother was no 
longer capable of comforting him; he had changed in Indonesia and, consequently, 
so had the relationship with his loved ones. It was not just the fact that his direct 
surroundings would not understand what happened in the Indies, but he also 
changed as a person. He was no longer the same son to his mother who could be 
comforted when he had a bad dream. He was now more worldwise than her and 
everyone who had stayed behind.   
As mentioned above, some of these traumas did not start to haunt the 
soldiers until much later. Anton P. de Graaff mentions in his contribution an 
example of a soldier whose experiences did not start to bother him until years 
after he had returned. He eventually immigrated to Australia. It seems as though 
his morals shifted in the years after his return to The Netherlands.  
The veteran, who also wished to stay anonymous in de Graaff’s collection 
of stories wrote in a letter to him: ‘After my friend’s death, and after those four 
‘peloppers’ were captured, I volunteered to be part of the firing squad that was going 
to conduct the execution. They were sentenced to death, which at the time felt greatly 
satisfactory to me. Nowadays I do have problems with it. Nowadays I often think that 
these were also people. And now we just have to live with it. We already maintained 
for so many years, surely we can handle a few more.’ 86  
                                                        
85 T. v.d. Locht, De Kist; het levensverhaal van Thé van de Locht. [S.I.], s.n.] (2008) 122: ‘De Indië-
tijd ben ik niet vergeten. Wat zich daar heeft afgespeeld, de vreselijke gebeurtenissen die ik heb 
meegemaakt, beleef ik opnieuw in mijn slaap. Dan staat mijn moeder bij mijn bed en ze vraagt 
wat er is. Ze staat daar net zoals in mijn jeugd toen ik telkens droomde dat ik in de waterput viel. 
Als ik het uitschreeuwde, dan was mijn moeder bij het bed. Ik ben vaak in die put gevallen, maar 
heb nooit de bodem gehaald. Als ze nu vraagt wat er aan de hand is, vertel ik dat niet. Zelfs in 
mijn brieven heb ik nooit geschreven over de akelige gebeurtenissen in Indië. Maar ze heeft het 
wel ontdekt in mijn foto’s die ze heeft bekeken. Als ze dan bij nacht en ontij aan mijn bed staat, 
zegt ze: “Ik kan je ook niet helpen, maar met veel bidden en hard werken gaat het misschien wel 
over?” 
86 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 17: “Na de dood van mijn vriend en toen die vier 
peloppers inmiddels gevangengenomen waren, heb ik mij vrijwillig gemeld voor het 
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Krijn van Putten, a conscripted corporal in the second division of the ‘Corps 
Special Troops’, is another example of having posttraumatic stress disorder at a 
later stage. He wrote his story in a blog. It is written in the third person, but it is 
biographical nonetheless: ‘the score of four scared years of misery and grief, 
running around until you were completely worn out, getting treated like a scabby 
dog and being a constant target: the score is zero! Being years behind on your 
colleagues who have already finished their education and were able to find 
themselves the best jobs. Yet again we had to do the dirty work and shut up about it. 
It is once again going to be the same mess in this stuffy, timid, rotten country and it 
will never change. For ten years Krijn worked his ass off and after a while things 
seemed to look up a little bit for him and everyone. But things kept bothering him; 
trauma’s during childhood and later on during the war and in Indonesia. Around his 
sixtieth, Krijn collapsed. A disorder consisting of a few letters [P.T.S.D. ed.]. A very 
wise family doctor and his own strong will keeps the damage limited and he can still 
enjoy his pension without having to take a yellow or green pill every day. But still: 
robbed and cheated from all sides!’ 87   
Bitterness seeps through this entire citation. Practically all of the 
documents I analyzed mention struggles with the past. It is not always mentioned 
specifically that they suffer from PTSD, but it appears as though these struggles – 
whether they were struggling with traumas or with trying to pick up their lives, 
are what urged them to document their stories.   
                                                        
executiepeloton. Ze kregen de doodstraf, wat toen een grote voldoening voor me was. Nu heb ik 
er problemen mee. Nu denk ik wel eens dat dat ook mensen waren. We zullen er maar mee 
blijven leven. Zoveel jaar hebben we het volgehouden, die paar jaar die we nog te goed hebben 
kunnen er ook nog wel bij.” 
87 Krijn van Putten, De jaren 1926-1950 nader bekeken in 2004, www.krijnvanputten.com (2004) 
Last consulted 23rd August 2015, Hoofdstuk 11, ‘Naar huis': ‘De balans is vlug opgemaakt. 
Opbrengst van vier bange jaren ellende en verdriet, je te barste lopen, behandeld worden als een 
schurftige hond en voor schietschijf spelen: het saldo is nul komma nul! Jaren van achterstand op de 
collega’s die hun studie al hebben afgerond en de beste baantjes hebben weten te versieren. Weer het 
vuile werk en je kop dicht houden. Het wordt weer dezelfde zooi in dit benauwde benepen rot land en 
het zal nooit veranderen. Tien jaar werkt Krijn zich te barste en dan wordt het pas weer een beetje beter 
voor hem en iedereen. Maar altijd blijft er wat knagen, de trauma’s opgelopen in de jeugd, later in de 
oorlog en in Indonesie. Tegen zijn zestigste stort Krijn helemaal in elkaar. Een syndroom van een paar 
letters. Een heel verstandige huisarts en zijn eigen ijzeren wil houden de schade beperkt en hij kan gaan 
genieten van zijn pensioen, zonder iedere dag om de paar uur een groen of een geel pilletje. Maar nog 
steeds bestolen en belazerd en voorgelogen van alle kanten!’ 
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The majority, if not all of the storytellers in my research felt let down, as if 
no one acknowledged the sacrifices they made in Indonesia, or how they ‘lost’ the 
best years of their lives. In one interview, with Mr. Jelsma, this feeling of being let 
down is in my view illustrated clearly. Jelsma, who was twenty-one when he left 
for Indonesia in 1946 and a conscripted truck driver within the supply and 
transport troops of the “7 December division”, talks about the payment for Indië-
veterans that they could apply for in the second half of the 1990s.  
‘A short while ago, we could apply for those thousand guilders, right? And in the first 
instance, I was rejected. […] You could sent in a note consisting arguments that said: 
‘well, I suffered to this and that extent’, and then you would receive those thousand 
guilders. But I, however, received a note that I did not qualify. It didn’t say that 
literally, but it did say that they needed to investigate further whether or not I would 
qualify. I almost exploded at that point. These were eight years of your life, the first 
five [WWII, ed.] weren’t their fault, and I realize that, but those three remaining 
years were. And then they’re talking about whether or not you potentially might be 
entitled to a financial allowance, even though there was nothing for us, we left with 
poor armament, and when we came back there was nothing for us. But those eight 
years of our young lives we lost, not to mention a potential career upon return. And 
after all this they’re discussing “should we grant this Mr. Jelsma these thousand 
guilders? For what reason, why should we?”’88 Jelsma adds that this specific fact still 
bothers him nowadays (1999) much more than all the things he experienced back 
in Indonesia. This disillusion that most of the soldiers declared to have felt is very 
                                                        
88 H. (Henk) Jelsma , 1st June 1999, Theo Boiten, Stichting Mondelijke Geschiedenis Indonesië 
(SMGI) “kort geleden is nog die duizend euro aan de orde geweest he. En ik werd in de eerste 
instantie afgewezen. […] vijf jaar was het eerst en toen kreeg je zeven-en-een-half duizend euro. 
En er waren toen stemmen opgegaan dat eigenlijk die jongens die dan zo’n drie jaar waren 
geweest, die moesten maar zo’n duizend euro krijgen. Je kon een briefje insturen, maar er 
moesten wel bepaalde dingen zijn waardoor je dan kon zeggen, nou: ‘ik heb die en die schade 
geleden’ en dan kreeg je die duizend gulden. Maar ik kreeg dus een briefje dat ik niet in 
aanmerking kwam. Zo stond het er niet precies, maar er stond wel dat ze het nog verder zouden 
onderzoeken of ik eventueel in aanmerking kwam. Toen ontplofte ik bijna, want toen kwam 
hetzelfde naar boven wat ik nu heb. Het zijn acht jaar van je jonge leven, die eerste vijf jaar, daar 
konden ze niks aan doen dat weet ik wel, maar die andere drie jaar wél. En dan praten ze over of 
je eventueel wel recht zou kunnen hebben op een financiële tegemoetkoming terwijl er niets 
voor ons was, we met slechte bewapening daar naartoe gestuurd zijn, toen we terugkwamen dat 
er niets voor ons was, er werd ook helemaal niets voor ons gedaan. Maar de acht jaar van ons 
jonge leven waren we kwijt, dan praten we nog niet eens over een carriëre opbouwen, en dan 
gaan ze ergens in Den Haag of in Heerlen bij de USZO, zitten praten van ‘zouden we die meneer 
Jelsma nou die duizend gulden wel gunnen? Wat is er eigenlijk voor reden, waarom zouden we?’  
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well illustrated in this citation; the notion that you, as a young inexperienced boy, 
commit yourself to your native country and fight in name of your government, and 
then having to justify afterwards whether or not you are entitled to a small 
financial gesture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I addressed the question how it can be that these stories, from 
different - groups of - soldiers, are so similar. Which factors influenced the soldiers 
to document their experiences in a specific period of time, and what caused the 
similarities of the content of these stories? 
We cannot assume that the individuals on which this analysis is based are fully 
representative for the, approximately, 220 000 soldiers who served in the Dutch 
East Indies between 1945 and 1950. De authors/speakers of the used ego 
documents belong to an exceptional group; they are part of less than 1 percent of 
the whole batch of soldiers who choose to share their experiences and memories 
with the public.89 Having said this, there is no reason to assume that the content 
                                                        
89 Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië, 310 
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of these narratives do not present an accurate image. The fact that this relatively 
small group of soldiers shares similar experiences, emotions and observations 
signifies several conclusions that can be drawn with regard to the impact of this 
conflict on the Dutch soldiers. Because certain significant elements are recurrent 
in the narratives of the soldiers, they have to be addressed and this analysis is 
therefore an important complement to the contemporary research of this conflict.  
 
Interpretations of the findings 
 
Firstly, I will present the interpretations and conclusions that can be drawn from 
the findings of the analyzed sources. 
Even though these soldiers are different people with different personalities 
and upbringing and can be subdivided in different templates, the similarities are 
striking: Both the first and second batch soldiers agree that they lacked 
information, were indoctrinated and were not aware well enough of what was 
actually going on politically. In hindsight they agree that they had been there 
merely due to bad politics. Even though they felt that they also experienced 
pleasant times in the Indies, and that there were a few of the story-telling soldiers 
that did not experience any struggles in terms of war traumas, the majority of the 
analyzed sources show they had a difficult time dealing with what they had 
witnessed.  
 As mentioned before, the soldiers all have in common that they can be 
regarded as social beings that migrated. They had to adapt to a completely 
different country; its climate, the people, and worst, the guerilla nature of the war 
they unexpectedly found themselves to be a part of. They found comfort in Dutch 
celebrations, such as Sinterklaas and Christmas. A great majority of the ego 
documents had a very extensive description about typical Dutch celebrations, and 
how they found comfort in theatrical comic relief, and music. They came back as 
changed men in a society that had barely changed at all, realizing that people from 
different regions or religions were not necessarily all that different from them. 
They matured in the sense that they now knew what was important in life. 
Material things did no longer interest them. For instance the festivities upon 
return, including the presents they got, meant only little to them. They were 
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merely happy to see their loved ones again and were more aware of injustice in 
the world, and the fact that their fellow countrymen had a rather acceptable life 
compared to the Indonesian inhabitants.    
The fact remains that these young soldiers were very ill prepared for 
Indonesia. Not just for the war at hand, but most of them never even left their own 
province and had no clue about the cultural differences they were going to meet. 
The fact that the soldiers had to wait for so long to return home influenced their 
perception greatly in the negative sense. This lack of information beforehand and 
during the conflict is one aspect that is very present in this collective narrative. 
These experiences are mentioned in practically all of the documents and 
interviews.      
All of the soldiers returning were disappointed with the Dutch government, so 
that is a collective part of the narrative; however, there are some discrepancies in 
this disappointment. The fourth category of soldiers, i.e. the compassionate group 
of soldiers, were also disappointed in the government due to their position 
towards Indonesia. The fact that there was only interest in economic gain, rather 
than actually protecting the Indonesian people made them even more critical 
towards the government. Whereas the group of victimized soldiers were primarily 
disappointed about the fact that the Dutch government did not do enough for them 
upon return, and on top of that, even started to question the level of violence 
inflicted by the Dutch soldiers. Regardless of the severity of the negative feelings, 
whether it was PTSD, or merely having trouble to pick up their lives, they all felt 
let down by their fellow countrymen and the government. They described how 
they felt as if the sacrifices they made were not being acknowledged by anyone, 
how no one even had a clue to what had actually been going on back in the Indies. 
        
In most of the documents there is mention of the motivation for sharing 
these experiences and the majority explains it had to do with gaining 
understanding about everything they went through as young boys. Not just for 
their family and friends, but also in the light of discussions that did not arise until 
after the 1970s and 80s. Points of discussion that became urgent again around that 
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time mostly revolved around the fact that the soldiers had received little 
understanding from the people back home and, especially, from the government. 
Also a point of discussion, something that infuriated a large number of veterans, 
was the fact that they felt accused of committing war crimes.  
All the soldiers mention the lost years of their lives; the fact that they went 
to Indonesia to serve their country and that there was nothing to show for it when 
they returned. This is what is often emphasized on, more than the actual traumas 
from the war itself: the fact that they were not in their home country to enjoy an 
education and to get a good job and start a family with their significant others, 
unlike their peers who did get to stay at home.  
 
Main conclusions 
In my chapter on historiography I explained how the perspective of the individual 
is of great importance in understanding the conflict and the experiences of these 
young men, and the fact that this perspective has thus far been underexposed in 
most of the previous researches I addressed in my historiography. Until recently, 
the primary focus has been on the factual historical events during and after the 
war, even though there are divergences between these factual historical events 
and the participants of these events who are emotionally involved. The need for 
the Dutch soldiers to give meaning to what happened collides with the rationality 
of historical reconstructions. 90  Soldiers certainly feel the pain and fear of 
separation and alienation quite acutely, but their experiences are almost never 
addressed as those of regular human beings.91 
 In primarily focusing on the experiences of the soldiers and regarding them as 
social beings rather than military men, I add a few important factors that are an 
important part of the history of this conflict and its soldiers.  
 
As I have mentioned in my introduction chapter, I argue that the main reason 
for the collective nature of these stories can be derived from the fact that they 
were all unknowing about the Dutch East Indies beforehand, and their 
                                                        
90 Scagliola, Last van de Oorlog, 364 
91 Sanborn, ‘Unsettling the Empire’, 297 
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expectations were effectively opposite to the actual events and experiences. This 
is roughly the reason for the content of the stories. The main reason why this 
collective story originated within a specific time frame has in a general sense to 
do with the fact that there was little attention to the individual story in the 1950s. 
The Dutch soldiers generally tried to pick up their lives and were even advised to 
forget about the ordeal.  
I argue that this led to bottled-up emotions, of which the soldiers were triggered 
to express by the five factors I explained in my introduction and theory. These five 
triggers were all, albeit some more than others, reasons for the soldiers to start 
telling their stories fairly around the same period of time, and these triggers also 
stimulated them into focusing on specific similar subjects they all felt strongly 
about.  
In my conclusion, I’ve combined some of these five factors together in one 
paragraph, because the content of the conclusions regarding these factors are 
closely related and complementary. This leaves us with three main concluding 
paragraphs in which I explain why the Dutch soldiers were triggered in writing a 
collective story: 
1. The negative image in the Netherlands of the war, and the reports and 
accusations of excessive violence 
2. The Vietnam effect, and the reunion-effect 
3. The fact that they have a shared past and are part of a generation 
 
1. The negative image in the Netherlands of the war, and the reports and 
accusations of excessive violence      
 Jan Hoffenaar concluded in his article that one of the major incentives for 
the disappointment of the soldiers on their return was the fact that the return 
itself had been postponed regularly. He argued that disappointment grew due to 
this fact and they started to become more critical and skeptical, and therefore 
became even less inclined to remain positive. However, as the sources I analyzed 
show, having roots in one’s society is an intrinsic part of belonging to your 
community; after having been away for so long, these soldiers expressed to have 
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lost their roots. Many of them could not find solid ground back in the Netherlands 
and the mere fact that their return was postponed had only partially to do with it, 
in my view. Sure, they started to acknowledge that the war they had fought was 
lost and pointless, and many felt frustrated about that. But at first, after many of 
them were welcomed back with festivities and presents, they felt good about being 
back, even though the fact that they did not care for material things such as 
presents is mentioned often. They were merely happy to see their loved ones 
again.  
The fact that they felt as if their presence in Indonesia had been in vain also, in my 
view, plays a significant role in their disappointment with how they were received 
back home. The fact that they realized the information they had gotten beforehand 
turned out to be untrue made them more critical and bitter than the fact that their 
return kept on being postponed. They had put their lives on hold for nothing, was 
the general sentiment.  
As mentioned before, J.W.M. Schulten addressed the problems with the 
demobilization of these soldiers on four levels: the medical and social care for 
those who got injured, financial reliefs, the psychological problems of the veterans 
that did not get addressed until much later after they had returned, and the need 
for recognition of what the soldiers had achieved in Indonesia for their 
government. This last point is specifically mentioned most in the stories I have 
analyzed. Even though the fact that the psychological problems were not 
addressed properly upon return and the fact that they were only modestly 
financially compensated is also addressed, it becomes clear from their collective 
narrative that all these things add up to a lack of recognition. They regarded the 
fact that they were, in their view, only moderately compensated financially as 
proof that they were not appreciated for what they did for the government. The 
problems that Schulten addressed were therefore only elements of the actual 
problem and not singled out issues. J.W. Van Neden, who argues that the veterans’ 
biggest issue was the fact that their time in the Indies had been fruitless and 
unnecessary, underscores this. His view that the soldiers were deeply affected by 
the fact that they were not recognized properly is confirmed by the information I 
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gathered from these stories and is an important part of the reasons for these 
soldiers sharing these stories collectively.  
Even though conscripts, as well as volunteers, did not decide on their own to go 
and fight in the Dutch East Indies, they did leave home with the idea of gaining a 
hero status and going out on an adventure. Of course this does not apply to every 
soldier, but the majority had only little knowledge of what exactly was going on in 
the Indies. That this in fact was a brutal guerrilla war was something none of them 
saw coming. And what probably none of them expected most of all was the 
extremely lukewarm reception back home after the first welcoming festivities 
were over. This disappointment grew even more after the use of excessive 
violence became a prominent point of discussion in the Netherlands. While this 
was an important trigger for the soldiers to share their stories publicly, the fact 
that these stories were of a collective nature has, in my view, more to do with the 
fact that they shared and adopted each other’s views on these matters. It is well 
possible the returning soldiers perceived this reception more negatively than it 
actually was, merely due to the fact that expectations were almost opposite to 
what actually happened, and they all expected the same things, which makes it 
part of their collective narrative.  
 
 
2. The Vietnam effect and the reunion-effect 
As mentioned before, veteran movements started to arise after critical 
responses by scholars on the war in the Dutch East Indies started to come about 
after they had learned about the Vietnam War and its impact on American 
veterans. The realization that the Dutch soldiers should have been taken care of 
psychological became more prominent. This contributed as a trigger for many 
veterans to meet each other to share their experiences, traumas and views, and to 
start documenting this: to gain understanding and recognition, all these years 
later. It seems as though the disappointment with the actual reception did not 
come until a while later, when they realized how much interest there actually 
should have been, regarding psychological care and general understanding of 
what a war does to a human being. The fact that many of them did not start writing 
or talking about their discontentment until decades later also shows that it 
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became more urgent later on in their lives. The first decades, they were mostly 
just trying to move on. 
These soldiers did not have anyone to prepare them for the whole process 
of going to war and having to pick up their lives afterwards. They mostly just had 
each other to share their experiences and struggles with, so it is fair to assume that 
they influenced each others perspectives and that they, even indirectly, motivated 
each other to write down their experiences or to document them otherwise. This 
is emphasized by Anton P de Graaff, who wrote in one of the ego documents I 
analyzed for this research:  
 By passing on their stories, other former soldiers who share the same 
experiences and the same problems are being helped at the very least due to the idea 
that they aren’t ‘alone’. As ‘Pelita Nieuws’ wrote in a book review: ‘Also for those 
people who were born later and have no experience with war and hardship will enjoy 
these books because they show some insight in a profound period in Dutch history 
through the eyes of regular boys.’92 
During the yearly memorial of the war on September 6th, 2014 in 
Roermond, chaplain Liduin van den Broek urged the remaining soldiers to speak 
up and to lift their heavy hearts while they’re still around: ‘to share your memories 
with us, so that we learn from it.’93 
 
3. The storytellers and authors have a shared past and are part of a 
generation.  
In the documents I presented, an importunate sense of generation comes 
forth. As Van Doorn mentioned: 
‘People from the outside keep wondering why this connection between us – those 
who went to the Indies – is so strong… I think the comradeship, the fear, the tension, 
the hardships, and the longing for home over there, and the total lack of appreciation 
                                                        
92 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 7: “Ook voor degenen die later geboren zijn en uit ervaring 
niets weten van oorlog en ontbering, zijn deze boeken een aanrader omdat ze een blik geven op 
een ingrijpende periode in de Nederlandse geschiedenis, door de ogen van gewone jongens.”  
93 Indië herdenking  (Memorial service Dutch East Indies, Roermond) September 6th, 2014, 
Liduin van den Broek: “ Maar ik wil jullie op het hart drukken om toch, nu het nog kan, te praten. 
Om ons te laten delen in jullie herinneringen, zodat wij ervan leren. En dat hoeft niet altijd leuk te 
zijn” http://www.nim-roermond.nl/toespraken/vandenBroek2014.htm Last consulted on 23rd 
of August 2015 
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of the government for sacrifices we made over here, are the most important 
ingredients that contributed to this strong connection.’94    
This generation was brought up in the midst of excessive violence. From 1939 
onwards, their own country lived in captivity of mobilization, war and occupation. 
Instead of a happy ending of this battle in the Netherlands, there was an endless 
hunger winter and in the Dutch East Indies the revolutionary violence of the 
Bersiap started to take place. Neither for the Netherlands, nor for the Indies, was 
a peaceful transition from war to peace a reality. It was merely a transition to new 
sacrifices and new violence.95 And indeed, after a short period of recognition and 
welcoming festivities, the Netherlands just seemed to want to forget this hangover 
as fast as possible. As Anton P. de Graaff mentions in his book: 
‘A while later I was thinking about the difference in appreciation that veterans of 
different backgrounds accrue to. I’m thinking about the Canadian veterans, who are 
flown over here every year and receiving awards and homages and getting a heroes 
treatment. All the while we, Indies veterans, do not get anything but scorn and 
imputations, and we remain, even as elderly people, to cry about everything that 
happened to us unsolicited.’ 96 
This sense of ‘we’-connection or comradeship that propels this generation is to be 
found in most of the ego documents and the interviews, albeit explicitly as well as 
inexplicitly. Sometimes it would take years, even decades, before the veterans 
would look each other up again, and it seems that this particular generation 
became more acute as they grew older. This is also linked with the notion that 
many of them did not start to become burdened by traumas, or at least did not 
discuss it, until they were around their retirement age.  
                                                        
94 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 118 ‘Soldaat Ad’: “Buitenstaanders vragen zich af 
waarom die band tussen ons – Indië-gangers – zo sterk is… Ik denk dat de kameraadschap, de 
angst, de spanning, de ontberingen en het verlangen naar huis, daar en het totale gebrek aan 
waardering van de overheid voor de gebrachte offers hier, de voornaamste ingrediënten zijn die 
tot deze sterke binding hebben bijgedragen.”   
95 J.A.A. van Doorn en W.J. Hendrix, Het Nederlands/Indonesisch Conflict: Ontsporing van Geweld 
(Dieren 1983) 14 
96 De Graaff, Indië blijft ons bezighouden, 17-18 "Later heb ik zitten denken, aan het verschil in 
waardering die de veteranen van de verschillende pluimages ten deel valt. Ik denk aan de 
Canadese veteranen, die jaarlijks hiernaartoe gehaald worden en met rijen onderscheidingen op 
de borst alle eerbetoon in ontvangst kunnen nemen en als helden behandeld worden, terwijl ons, 
Indië-veteranen, niets anders dan hoon en verdachtmakingen ten deel viel en wij in onze 
ouderdom nog lopen te janken om alles wat ons ongevraagd  in Indië is overkomen.” 
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These young men were sent to the Indies during their most vulnerable and 
formative years: when they were young boys being sent off to a guerrilla war. As 
Van Doorn noted, these new experiences consequently often trigger a gap 
between this (self-) stigmatized group and its environment, i.e., the older 
generation as well as their peers who did not share the same experiences and 
therefore form a different generation. This fact is undeniably the case for most of 
the sources I read or listened to. Right after these boys returned home the first 
signs of the gap that had grown between the returning soldiers and the Dutch 
citizens that stayed at home had already occurred, and it would not take long for 
them to realize that they did not have anywhere to go with their experiences or 
traumas. 
 
Summarized, reasons why this collective narrative came to be can be explained in 
3 general ways: 
1. They hardly had any knowledge of the Indies beforehand, and had never 
before left their country or even their own village. This made them eager 
to share their experiences, but they were not given the chance after 
returning. They all felt misunderstood and unrecognized back home, and 
had nowhere to go with their stories and traumas, which led to bottled-up 
emotions that consequently came out as soon as society allowed this and 
certain events and discussions began to motivate them to not stay quiet 
anymore.  
2. They all received the same preparations and information and only had each 
other to learn from, and share their experiences with afterwards. This 
created a bond that motivated them to document their experiences, 
struggles and opinions.  
3. They all were in the Indies during the most formative years of their life: 
their early adulthood, during which their fellow countrymen were all 
progressing in terms of education, work and starting a family. This created 
a strong sense of us vs. them, which eventually enforced them to share their 
personal stories in an attempt to gain understanding and compassion.  
Additional thoughts 
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 Emotions of the affected parties are of great importance in reflecting on 
world events. Scholars often stress impersonal forces when they are discussing 
events that involve large numbers of people. However, the personal stories of 
these events are just as important.  
 The ego documents, as well as the interviews, show that the fact that these 
young men were in a different country with completely different manners had 
made a great impact. Everything was different, so it took a lot from them to adjust 
to a new way of living. Some of them met women there, fell in love and even had a 
child. The fact that they temporarily had a whole new life made it even more 
difficult to share their experiences with those who stayed at home and had no clue 
what it was like for them in the Dutch East Indies. How could they ever fully 
understand? Many of them returned decades later with their loved ones to show 
them the country that changed them so profoundly. Often the documents and 
interviews show not only the horrible side of the war, but also the good times they 
had. It is often mentioned that the soldiers also had pleasant memories of 
Indonesia. Apart from the horrible things of the war, they also had experienced 
times where they were merely young boys having fun, developing friendships, 
chasing women. 
The simple fact of leaving one’s community - which is comfortable and has 
family, friends and a mapped out future - for another community where there will 
be nothing that feels familiar restructures and redefines someone’s life 
profoundly. These young soldiers were forced to adapt to these entirely new 
surroundings, had to adjust their own cultural manners, and postpone their future 
plans. Only to return and start all over again for as far as they were concerned: 
feeling yet again alienated and dealing with a stagnated life in terms of education, 
finding a job, and starting a family.  
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